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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This work consists of two essays that investigate the pricing of credit risk in the 
equity and bond markets.  The first essay, “Is there a Distress Risk Anomaly? Bond 
Spread as a Proxy for Default Risk,” investigates the pricing of default risk in the 
cross section of equity returns.  The contribution of this paper to the literature is three-
fold.  First, the paper shows that the distress risk anomaly is an amalgamation of other 
anomalies and return relationships previously documented in the literature.  Second, this 
is the first paper to use corporate bond spreads to measure the ex-ante probability of 
default risk.  We show that in hazard rate regressions, credit spreads drive out the 
significance of most of the other measures that are used to predict corporate defaults and 
significantly improve the pseudo R
2
 values in all specifications.  Third, contrary to 
previous findings, we show that default risk is not priced negatively in the cross section of 
equity returns. We sort firms according to their exposures to the systematic component of 
default risk as well as their aggregate default risk.  To the best of my knowledge we are 
the first to explicitly rank equity returns according to firms‘ exposures to the systematic 
component of default risk.  Portfolios sorted both on credit spreads and on credit spreads 
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net of expected losses have positive raw returns but do not deliver significant positive or 
negative returns after controlling for well known risk factors. These findings challenge the 
previous studies that have found an anomalous relationship between credit risk and equity 
returns. The analyses in this paper take the right step towards finding a more appropriate 
measure of systematic default risk that can explain the cross section of equity returns in 
line with the rational expectations theory. 
The second essay, “Corporate Reputation and Cost of Debt”, investigates the role a 
firm‘s reputation plays in determining its cost of debt.  Although the theoretical literature 
since Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Diamond (1989) has recognized that reputation 
should impact credit relationships, to date that impact has never been fully quantified.  We 
show that firm reputation – that intangible way in which a company is perceived by others 
– plays an important role in determining the cost of debt.  We measure company 
reputation using the annual ranking of ―Most Admired Companies‖ published by Fortune 
magazine, which surveys industry experts about firm reputations.  We find a robust 
inverse relationship between a firm‘s reputation as measured by its score in the Fortune 
survey and the firm-level value-weighted credit spread on its bonds.  A half-point (0.5) 
improvement in the reputation score, or moving one quintile up in the reputation ranking,  
leads to a reduction of 10 to 20 basis points in the cost of debt capital, even after 
controlling for firm-level and macro-level variables that are known to impact bond 
spreads.  Change in the reputation score is also able to explain a substantial amount of the 
cross-sectional variation in change in credit spreads on corporate bonds.  Our findings 
contribute to the literature that has attempted to explain variation in credit spread changes, 
as prior studies have been able to explain only a small fraction of that variation.  Those 
studies find that a large component of credit spread changes is not explained by the 
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tangible information their models employ.  By explicitly accounting for an intangible 
element of credit risk, we substantially improve our ability to explain cross-sectional 
variation in credit spread changes.  To our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly 
account for this intangible component of reputation in explaining changes in the cost of 
debt capital.  Furthermore, we show that the impact of this intangible is most significant 
for firms that are informationally opaque or that already have high distress risk.  The 
sensitivity of cost of debt capital to changes in the reputation score is highest for smaller 
firms, for firms with lower analyst coverage, and for firms with higher distress risk.  We 
also show why the Fortune reputation score helps to explain credit spread changes: it 
captures soft information about whether a firm will fail to honor its commitments.  Our 
reputation measure is a good ex ante predictor of corporate distress and contains 
information about default risk above and beyond that conveyed by accounting and market 
variables, corporate ratings and structural parameters.  Our results show that credit risk 
has an important, but largely ignored, intangible aspect.       
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there a Distress Risk Anomaly ? 
Corporate Bond Spread as a Proxy for Default Risk
1
 
 
A fundamental tenet of asset pricing is that investors should be compensated with 
higher returns for bearing systematic risk that can not be diversified.  Recently, a 
number of papers examined whether default risk is such a systematic risk and whether 
it is priced in the cross section of equity returns.  On the theoretical side, default risk 
can be a priced factor if a firm‘s Beta within the framework of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) does not fully capture default-related risk.  Default risk may 
not be fully correlated with the market itself, but could be related to declines in other 
un-measured components of wealth such as human capital (Fama and French 1996) or 
risk related to debt securities (Ferguson and Shockley 2003) distinct from risk related 
to equities. Empirically, research thus far has focused on determining the ex-ante 
probability of firms failing to meet their financial obligations and testing to see if 
there is co-movement in security returns of firms in response to changes in an 
                                                          
1
 This chapter has been co-authored with Deniz Anginer. Deniz Anginer can be reached at the World 
Bank, E-mail: danginer@worldbank.org. Çelim Yıldızhan can be reached at Ross School of Business, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, E-mail: yildizha@umich.edu.  We would like to thank 
Dennis Capozza, Ilia Dichev, Jens Hilscher, Haitao Li, Paolo Pasquariello, Amiyatosh Purnanandam, 
Uday Rajan, Nejat Seyhun, Tyler Shumway, Jeff Smith, and Lu Zhang for helpful discussion and 
guidance.  
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empirically constructed default risk factor.  Previous studies have utilized different 
proxies and approaches to measure financial distress and have found anomalously low 
returns for stocks with high probabilities of default.
2
  The low returns on stocks with 
high default risk cannot be explained by Fama and French (1993) risk factors. Stocks 
with high distress risk tend to have higher market betas and load more heavily on size 
and value factors leading to significantly negative alphas. 
In this paper we argue that the anomalous results documented in the literature are 
due to the poor quality of the proxies used to measure default risk.  First, previous 
papers measure financial distress by determining firms‘ physical probabilities of 
default as opposed to risk-neutral probabilities of default.  This calculation ignores the 
fact that firm defaults are correlated and are more likely to occur in bad times, thus 
failing to appropriately account for the systematic nature of default risk. In this paper 
we use risk-neutral probabilities of default calculated from corporate bond spreads in 
order to account for the systematic variation in default risk.
3
  The fixed-income 
literature has provided substantial evidence for a systematic component in corporate 
credit spreads justifying our use of this measure as a proxy for firm exposure to 
systematic default risk.
4
  It has been well documented (see for instance Almeida and 
Philippon 2007 and Berndt et al. 2005) that there is a substantial difference between 
the risk-neutral and historical (physical) probabilities of default. Ranking stocks based 
                                                          
2
 See for instance Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008).  
3
 Almeida and Philippon (2007), Hull, Predescu and White (2006) provide empirical evidence on the 
difference between real-world and risk-neutral default probabilities implied by credit spreads. 
4
 The spread between corporate bond yields and maturity matched treasury rates is too high to be fully 
captured by expected default and has been shown to contain a large risk premium for systematic 
default risk. See for detailed analysis: Elton et. al (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Longstaff et. al 
(2005), Driessen (2005), Berndt et. al (2005). 
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on their physical default probabilities, as done in Dichev (1998), Campbell, Hilscher 
and Szilagyi (2008) and other papers in this literature, implicitly assumes that stocks 
with high physical probabilities of default also have high exposures to systematic 
variation in default risk. George and Hwang (2009) show that a firm‘s physical 
probability of default does not necessarily reflect the firm‘s exposure to systematic 
default risk. In fact, George and Hwang (2009) show that firms with higher 
sensitivities to systematic default risk make capital structure choices that reduce their 
physical probabilities of distress. It is, therefore, not correct to rank firms based on 
their physical default probabilities when pricing financial distress, since such a 
ranking would not properly reflect firms‘ exposures to systematic default risk, the 
only type of default risk that should be rewarded with a premium.  Default risk 
measures previously used in the literature ignore this fundamental fact. 
Second, previous papers have shown three stock characteristics – idiosyncratic 
volatility, leverage and profitability – to be most closely associated with high 
corporate default rates.  High idiosyncratic volatility, high leverage and low 
profitability predict high default probability.  However these are the same 
characteristics that are known to be associated with expected future returns. Within 
the q-theory framework (Cochrane 1991, Liu, Whited and Zhang 2009), low 
profitability (more likely to default) firms have low expected future returns.  
Similarly, firms with high leverage (more likely to default) and high idiosyncratic 
volatility (more likely to default) have low stock returns (Korteweg 2004, Dimitrov 
and Jain 2005, Penman et al. 2007, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 2008).  It is not 
clear if the distress anomaly is just the manifestation of one or more of these 
previously documented return relationships.  We show that the difference in returns 
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between high and low distress stock portfolios becomes insignificant once we control 
for these three stock characteristics.   
   In this paper, we take a different approach to measuring default risk and use a 
market based measure, namely corporate credit spreads, to proxy for distress risk.  We 
compute credit spreads as the difference between the bond yield of firm and the 
corresponding maturity matched treasury rate.  This measure offers several 
advantages over others that have been utilized in the literature thus far. Unlike 
structural models of corporate bankruptcy that make simplifying assumptions about 
the capital structure of a firm, our proposed measure is model and assumption free.  
And unlike stock characteristics used to measure default risk, which may reflect 
information about future returns unrelated to distress risk, credit spreads reflect the 
market consensus view of the credit quality of the underlying firm.  Moreover, credit 
spreads contain a risk-premium for systematic risk. As such, unlike previously used 
measures, credit spread, is a proxy for the market-implied risk-adjusted (or risk-
neutral) probability of default and is a better measure of exposure to systematic 
default risk. We show that credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than 
previously used measures based on structural models, bond ratings and accounting 
variables.  Using credit spreads, we find that there is no evidence of firms with high 
default risk delivering anomalously low returns, and we do not find default risk to be 
a priced risk factor in the cross-section of equity returns.   
Ours is not the first paper to study the relationship between default risk and equity 
returns.  Dichev (1998) uses Altman‘s z-score and Ohlson‘s o-score to measure 
financial distress.  He finds a negative relationship between default risk and equity 
returns during the 1981-1995 time period.  In a related study, Griffin and Lemmon 
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(2002), using the    o-score to measure default risk, find that growth stocks with high 
probabilities of default have low returns.  Using a comprehensive set of accounting 
measures, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (hereafter CHS) show that stocks 
with high risk of default deliver anomalously low returns.  Garlappi, Shu, and Yan 
(2005), who obtain default risk measures from Moody‘s KMV, also find similar 
results to those of Dichev (1998) and CHS (2008). They attribute their findings to the 
violation of the absolute priority rule. 
George and Hwang (2009) suggest that firms with higher sensitivities to 
systematic default risk make capital structure choices that reduce their overall 
physical probabilities of default and argue that the negative relationship between 
returns and leverage can explain the pricing of distress risk anomaly.  Avramov et al. 
(2007) show that most of the negative return for high default risk stocks is 
concentrated around rating downgrades. Vassalou and Xing (2004) find some 
evidence that distressed stocks, mainly in the small value group, earn higher returns.
5
  
Chava and Purnanandam (2008) argue that the poor performance of high distress 
stocks is limited to the post-1980 period when investors were positively surprised by 
defaults.  When they use implied cost of capital estimates from analysts' forecasts to 
proxy for ex-ante expected returns, they find a positive relationship between default 
risk and expected returns.  
Our paper is different from the rest of the papers in the literature since we 
specifically aim to construct a default risk measure that ranks firms based on their 
                                                          
5
 Da and Gao (2005) argue that Vassalou and Xing‘s results are limited to one month returns on stocks 
in the highest default likelihood group which trade at very low prices.  They show that returns are 
contaminated by microstructure noise and the positive one month return is compensation for increased 
liquidity risk. 
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exposures to systematic default risk, rather than ranking firms based on their physical 
probabilities of default. 
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature on bankruptcy prediction.
6
  In 
particular, we show the importance of market based variables in predicting 
bankruptcy.  Corporate bond spreads significantly increase the pseudo R
2‘s in hazard 
regressions when we run a horse race of corporate spreads with a comprehensive set 
of accounting measures, bond ratings and structural model parameters previously 
used in the literature.  Adding corporate spread to the covariates used in CHS (2008), 
for instance, increases the pseudo R
2 
from 27.6% to 37.4%.
7
  These results strongly 
indicate that corporate bond spreads contain default information above and beyond 
the measures commonly used in the literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Sections 2.1 and 2.2 describe the 
data and the different default measures used in this study.  Section 2.3 reports the 
return analyses for high default risk stocks and examines the relationship between 
various stock characteristics and default risk.  Section 2.4 describes the use of credit 
spreads as a predictor of corporate bankruptcy and as a proxy for default risk, and also 
contains the asset pricing tests to see if default risk, as measured by credit spreads, is 
priced in the cross section of equity returns.  Section 2.5 concludes.   
2.1 Data 
In this section, we briefly describe the data sources used in this study. Firm level 
accounting and price information are obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the 
                                                          
6
 See for instance Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984), Ohlson (1986), Shumway (2001), and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004). 
7
 Using corporate spread as the lone predictor variable yields a pseudo R
2
 of 26.5% similar to the 
pseudo R
2
 obtained from using all of the CHS (2008) covariates.   
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1980–2008 time period. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 through 6999) 
from the sample.   To avoid the influence of microstructure noise we also exclude 
firms priced less than one dollar in the analyses that follow.  The data items used to 
construct distress measures are explained in detail in the Appendix. 
Corporate defaults between 1981 and 2008 are identified from the Moody‘s 
Default Risk Services‘ Corporate Default database, SDC Platinum‘s Corporate 
Restructurings database, Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, and 
Shumway‘s (2001) list of bankruptcies. We choose 1981 as the earliest year for 
identifying bankruptcy filings as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is likely to have 
caused the associations between accounting variables and the probability of 
bankruptcy to change. Furthermore, we have little corporate bond yield information 
prior to 1980. In all, we obtain a total of 548 firm bankruptcies covering the period 
1981–2008, for which we have complete accounting-based measures. 94 of these 
bankruptcies also have corresponding corporate bond spread information.   
Corporate bond data used in this study comes from three separate databases: the 
Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database (Lehman) for the period 1974 to 1997, the 
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) for the period 1998 to 2002, and the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system dataset from 2003 to 2008. We 
also use the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Database (NAIC) for 
bond descriptions.  Due to the small number of observations prior to the year 1980, 
we include only the period 1980 to 2008 in the analyses that follow. 
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Our sample includes all U.S. corporate bonds listed in the above datasets that 
satisfy a set of selection criteria commonly used in the corporate bond literature.
8
 We 
exclude all bonds that are matrix-priced (rather than market-priced) from the sample. 
We remove all bonds with equity or derivative features (i.e. callable, puttable, and 
convertible bonds), bonds with warrants, and bonds with floating interest rates. 
Finally, we eliminate all bonds that have less than one year to maturity.   
For all selected bonds, we extract beginning of month credit spreads calculated as 
the difference between the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity 
matched treasury rate.  There are a number of extreme observations for the variables 
constructed from the different bond datasets. To ensure that statistical results are not 
heavily influenced by outliers, we set all observations higher than the 99
th
 percentile 
value of a given variable to the 99
th
 percentile value. All values lower than the first 
percentile of each variable are winsorized in the same manner.  For each firm, we 
calculate a value-weighted average of that firm‘s outstanding bond spreads, using 
market values of the bonds as weights.  There are 107,692 firm months and 1,011 
unique firms with credit spread and firm level data.  There is no potential survivorship 
bias in our sample as we do not exclude bonds that have gone bankrupt or those that 
have matured.  
As not all companies issue bonds, it is important to discuss the limitations of our 
dataset.  We compute summary statistics for default measures and financial 
characteristics of the companies in our bond sample and for all companies in CRSP.  
These results are summarized in Table 2.1.  Not surprisingly, companies in the bond 
                                                          
8
 See for instance Duffee (1999), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Avramov et al. 
(2006). 
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sample are larger and show a slight value tilt.  There is, however, significant 
dispersion in size, market-to-book, and credit spread values.  The bond sample covers 
a small portion of the total number of companies, but a substantial portion in terms of 
total market capitalization.  For instance, in the year 1997, the number of firms with 
active bonds in our sample constitutes about 4% of all the firms in the market.  
However, in terms of market capitalization, the dataset captures about 40% of 
aggregate equity market value in 1997.  In section 2.3, we show that the distress 
anomaly as described by CHS (2008) and others exists in our bond sample.   
 
2.2 Default Risk Measures 
There is a vast literature on the statistical modeling of the probability of bankruptcy.  
In this paper, we create measures of financial distress based on three models of 
bankruptcy prediction that have been utilized by previous researchers investigating 
the pricing of distress risk.     
 
2.2.1 Static models 
Static models of bankruptcy prediction employ either a multiple discriminant analysis 
as in Altman (1968) or a conditional logit model as in Ohlson (1980), to assess which 
firm characteristics are important in determining the probability of financial distress.  
These models then use the estimates from the single period classification to predict 
future implied probability of bankruptcy.
9
   In this paper, we use parameters used to 
construct Altman‘s z-score and Ohlson‘s o-score, two popular measures that have 
                                                          
9
 Using single period observations introduce a bias in static models that is discussed in Shumway 
(2001). 
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been widely used in empirical research and practice.  Altman‘s z-score is defined as 
the following: 
 
z-score = 1.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 1.0 WCTA RETA EBITTA METL STA  
 (2.1) 
 
where  WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets, RETA is the ratio of 
retained earnings to total assets, EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets, METL is the ratio of market equity to total liabilities, and STA is 
the ratio of sales to total assets. Ohlson‘s o-score is defined as: 
 
-score 1.32 0.407 log( ) 6.03 1.43 
0.076 1.72 2.37 1.83 
0.285 0.521 
o SIZE TLTA WCTA
CLCA OENEG NITA FUTL
INTWO CHIN
 (2.2) 
 
where SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, TLTA is the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets, CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, 
OENEG is a dummy variable set equal to one if total liabilities exceeds total assets 
and zero otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets, FUTL is the ratio 
of funds from operations to total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one 
if net income was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is a 
measure of the change in net income.  The accounting variables used to construct the 
z-score and the o-score are described in detail in the appendix. 
2.2.2 Dynamic models 
Dynamic models of bankruptcy prediction (Shumway 2001, Chava and Jarrow 2004 
and CHS 2008) use a dynamic panel regression approach and incorporate market 
 14 
 
based variables such as market capitalization and past equity returns. Dynamic 
models prediction avoid the biases of the static models by adjusting for potential 
duration dependence issues.  In this paper we use the CHS (2008) specification: 
 
-   9.164 20.264 1.416 
7.129 1.411 0.045 
2.132 0.075 0.058 
t t t
t t t
t t t
CHS score NIMTAAVG TLMTA
EXRETAVG SIGMA RSIZE
CASHMTA MB PRICE
 
 (2.3) 
 
where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of 
net income to the market value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to 
the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of 
monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, SIGMA is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the 
log ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, 
CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-
book ratio, PRICE is the log price per share truncated from above at $15.
10
 
 
2.2.3 Structural Model 
The third measure we use in this study is based on the structural default model of 
Merton (1974). This approach treats the equity value of a company as a call option on 
the company‘s assets.  The probability of bankruptcy is based on the ―distance-to-
default‖ measure, which is the difference between the asset value of the firm and the 
face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm‘s asset value.  
There are a number of different approaches to calculating the distance-to-default 
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measure. We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) in constructing this 
measure, the details of which are provided in the appendix. 
 
2.3. Pricing of Default Risk 
2.3.1 Returns to Distressed Stocks 
In this section we analyze the effect of default risk on stock returns. We sort 
stocks into deciles each January from 1981 through 2008, according to their default 
probabilities calculated using the CHS-score.
11
  In the analyses that follow, we 
exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 through 6999); we also exclude firms priced 
less than one dollar as of the portfolio formation date from the sample to avoid the 
influence of microstructure noise.  The stocks in each decile portfolio are held for a 
year.  Following CHS (2008), if a delisting return is available we use the delisting 
return, otherwise we use the last available return in CRSP.  We repeat the same 
analyses for stocks in our bond dataset.  To save space we only report returns for the 
top and bottom deciles, and the difference between the top and bottom deciles.   
We compute the value-weighted return for these decile portfolios on a monthly 
basis and regress the portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate on the market 
(MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors: 
 
r = i i i i i i it MKT t SMB t HML t MOM t tMKT SMB HML MOM  
 (2.4) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
10
 In computing the CHS-score, we use coefficients on the variables calculated from rolling regressions 
to avoid a look-ahead bias.  We thank Jens Hilscher for providing this data. 
11
 We obtain similar results using Merton‘s distance-to-default measure, Ohlson‘s o-score and 
Altman‘s z-score, which are not reported to save space.  
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The results are reported in Table 2.2.  The results under ‗Bond Sample‘ on the 
right hand side include only the companies in our bond sample.   
Our results are consistent with those obtained in the previous studies. Stocks in 
the highest default risk portfolio have significant negative returns.  Using the CHS 
default probability, the difference in returns between the highest and lowest default 
risk portfolios is -1.24% per month.  The intercepts from the market and the 4-factor 
models are economically and statistically significant.  For the CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
universe, monthly 4-factor alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed by going long on 
stocks in the highest default risk decile and short on stocks in the lowest default risk 
decile is -0.83% per month.  The results are weaker for the bond sample, but still 
economically and statistically significant.  Using firms that have corresponding credit 
spread information, the monthly 4-factor alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed by 
going long on stocks in the highest default risk decile and short on stocks in the 
lowest default risk decile is  -0.32%.  We repeat the analyses using Merton‘s distance-
to-default measure, Ohlson‘s o-score and Altman‘s z-score.  The results are 
qualitatively similar and we do not report them here to save space. 
The loadings on the size and value factors suggest that distressed stocks are 
mostly small and value stocks.  The loading on the momentum factor is consistent 
with the intuition that distressed stocks tend to have low returns prior to portfolio 
formation.  These results are consistent across different measures of distress, and the 
results hold in our bond sample suggesting that our study doesn‘t suffer from sample 
biases. 
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2.3.2 Stock Characteristics and Distress Returns 
Previous research has identified a number of stock characteristics that predict high 
default probabilities for companies.  However, three characteristics – leverage, 
idiosyncratic volatility and profitability – have been shown to be most closely 
associated with corporate default rates.  High leverage, high idiosyncratic volatility 
and low profitability predict higher rates of corporate default.  As mentioned earlier, 
these are the same characteristics that are ex-ante associated with low future returns.  
Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006, 2008) establish a robust relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. This negative relationship has been termed 
the ‗idiosyncratic volatility puzzle‘, since rational asset pricing theories predict that 
the relationship be positive or that there be no relationship at all.
12
  Korteweg (2004), 
Dimitrov and Jain (2005), Penman et al. (2007) show a negative relationship between 
leverage and stock returns – the ‗leverage anomaly‘.  Similarly, low profitability 
predicts low returns.  Q-theory provides a theoretical link between profitability and 
equity returns (Cochrane 1991, Liu, Whited and Zhang 2009).  It is not clear if 
distress anomaly is just an amalgamation of one or more of these previously 
documented return relationships. In this section we investigate in detail the 
relationship between default risk and these three stock characteristics.  In particular 
we want to see if the distress anomaly persists once we explicitly control for 
idiosyncratic volatility, profitability and leverage.  
                                                          
12
 Merton (1987), Malkiel and Xu (2002) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) link higher returns on 
high- volatility stocks to investors not being able to diversify. There have been some behavioral and 
agency-based explanations for the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and returns.  
The behavioral model of Barberis and Huang (2001) predicts that higher idiosyncratic volatility stocks 
should earn higher expected returns. Falkenstein (1996) reports that mutual fund managers prefer to 
hold more volatile stocks for the upside option value they provide. 
 18 
 
 To control for these three stock characteristics, we perform a double sort.  We sort 
stocks into five groups each January from 1981 to 2008 according to the CHS 
probability of default. Then within each distress group we sort stocks based on the 
previous year‘s stock characteristic (idiosyncratic volatility, profitability or leverage) 
into five groups, creating a total of 25 portfolios.  We then calculate 4-factor alphas 
for the distress portfolios after controlling for the effects of the characteristics.  We do 
this by averaging the returns of the five distress portfolios over each of the 
characteristic portfolios.  We use NIMTAAVG as the profitability measure and 
TLMTA as the leverage measure.  Both variables are described in Section 2.2.  We 
follow Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) and calculate idiosyncratic volatility 
relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model.  First, we regress daily stock returns from 
the previous calendar year on the Fama-French 3 factors: 
 
r = i i i i i it MKT t SMB t HML t tMKT SMB HML   (2.5) 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility is then calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals: 
var it . 
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports 4-factor alphas for the five distress portfolios, as 
well as 4-factor alphas for the distress portfolios after controlling for the three stock 
characteristics.  We also report in Panel B of Table 2.3, average idiosyncratic 
volatility, leverage and profitability values for firms belonging to each of the five 
distress portfolios.  There is a strong relationship between distress risk and the three 
stock characteristics.  Idiosyncratic volatility increases monotonically from 2.5% for 
the lowest distress group to 4.5% for the highest group.  Leverage increases from 0.22 
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for the lowest distress group to 0.61 for the highest distress group.  Similarly, 
profitability for the lowest distress group is 1.2% and decreases monotonically to -
1.1%.  The unconditional 4-factor alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed by going 
long high distress stocks and shorting low distress stocks is -0.88% per month, yet 
this premium decreases to -0.61% after controlling for leverage.  Once we control for 
idiosyncratic volatility, the return spread between high and low distress stocks 
reduces to -0.54%.  Finally, controlling for profitability reduces the spread to -0.26% 
per month making it statistically insignificant.  These results suggest that the return to 
high minus low distressed stock portfolios can be attributed to idiosyncratic volatility, 
leverage and profitability.  The results are consistent with the notion that the distress 
risk anomaly is an amalgamation of other anomalies and return relationships 
previously documented in the literature.  
 
2.4 Corporate Spreads As a Measure of Default Risk 
Given the results in the previous section, instead of using stock characteristics to 
measure financial distress, we take a different approach and use yields on corporate 
bonds in excess of the treasury rate to measure ex-ante probability of default.  As 
mentioned earlier, this measure offers several advantages over others that have been 
used by previous papers.  It is available in high frequency, which increases the power 
of statistical analyses we carry out.  Unlike structural models of corporate bankruptcy 
that make simplifying assumptions about the capital structure of a firm, our proposed 
measure is model and assumption free.  And unlike stock characteristics that are used 
to measure default risk, which may reflect information about future returns unrelated 
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to distress risk, credit spreads reflect the market consensus view of the credit quality 
of the underlying firm. 
There is now a significant body of research that shows that default-risk 
constitutes a considerable portion of credit spreads.  Driessen (2003) finds that default 
risk accounts for at the minimum18% (AA rated bonds) and as high as 52% (BBB 
rated bonds) of the corporate bond spread. Huang and Huang (2003) using the 
Longstaff-Schwartz model find that distress risk accounts for 39%, 34%, 41%, 73%, 
and 93% of the corporate bond spread respectively for bonds rated Aa, A, Baa, Ba 
and B. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use the information in credit default swaps 
(CDS) to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and non-default components 
in corporate spreads.  They find that the default component represents 51% of the 
spread for AAA/AA rated bonds, 56% for A-rated bonds, 71% for BBB-rated bonds, 
and 83% for BB-rated bonds. The similarity in the information content of CDS 
spreads and bond credit spreads with respect to default is supported by Blanco, 
Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2005).  They confirm, through co-integration 
tests, that the theoretical parity relationship between these two types of credit spreads 
holds as a long run equilibrium condition.
13
 
 
2.4.1 Credit Spreads and Bankruptcy Prediction 
Consistent with the studies discussed above, in this section we empirically show that 
bond spreads are a good ex-ante predictor of corporate defaults.  In particular, we test 
to see if credit spreads improve default prediction beyond measures previously used 
                                                          
13
 In this study we have chosen to use bond spreads instead of CDS spreads because bond data is 
available for a substantially larger number of companies and is available for a much longer time period. 
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in the literature.
14
 To measure the probability that a firm defaults, we estimate a 
dynamic panel model using a logit specification, following Shumway (2001), Chava 
and Jarrow (2004), CHS (2008) and others.  We use information available at the end 
of the calendar year to predict defaults twelve months ahead. Specifically, the 
marginal probability of default (PD) for company i over the next year t is assumed 
to follow a logistic distribution: 
 
1
= 
1 exp
i
t i
t
PD
X
  (2.6) 
 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables available at the time of prediction, and 
includes a comprehensive list of explanatory variables that have been used by 
previous papers to predict corporate bankruptcy.   We utilize accounting variables 
used in calculating Altman‘s z-score, Ohlson‘s o-score, market based variables 
introduced by Shumway (2001) and CHS (2008), as well as Merton‘s distance-to-
default measure.  We also use Standard and Poor‘s (S&P) corporate ratings obtained 
from COMPUSTAT.  All the variables included in the hazard regressions that follow 
are described in detail in the Appendix.   
Table 2.5 reports results for the first set of hazard regressions.  In the first 
column, we use the same covariates (NIMTAVG, TLMTA, EXRETAVG, SIGMA, 
RSIZE, CASHMTA, MB and PRICE) used in CHS (2008).  The sample includes only 
firms that have issued bonds for the 1980 to 2008 time period.  As a comparison, we 
report the estimates using the full sample (including firms that have not issued bonds), 
                                                          
14
 Bharath and Shumway (2004) document that credit spreads contain useful information in predicting 
defaults.  In this paper, we significantly increase the number of defaults used in the hazard regressions, 
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and also estimates from the CHS (2008) study in columns 7 and 6 respectively.  The 
estimates from these three samples are very similar indicating that the bond dataset is 
not biased.  As we limit the sample to firms with only bonds outstanding, the eﬀects 
of market capitalization, relative value of the firm, firm profitability and volatility 
become slightly stronger, while the eﬀects of leverage, liquidity position of the firm, 
price and recent past  returns become slightly weaker. When we use Merton‘s 
distance-to-default (DD) measure as a predictor, we obtain similar results to those in 
CHS (2008).  Results from this regression are reported in column 4.  
Next, we add credit spreads (SPREAD) as an additional covariate to the CHS 
(2008) and the Merton specifications.  The estimates from these two regressions are 
reported in columns 2 and 5 respectively.  We also report estimates from a regression 
using SPREAD as the only covariate in column 3.  Our proposed measure improves 
the explanatory power of both the CHS and Merton models.  We report McFadden‘s 
pseudo R
2
 coefficients for each regression.
15  
The pseudo R
2
 value increases from 
27.6% for the CHS model to 37.4% for the CHS model used in conjunction with 
SPREAD in predicting bankruptcies.  The specification that uses SPREAD alone has a 
pseudo R
2
 value of 26.5% which is similiar to the pseudo R
2
 for the CHS 
specification.  Pseudo R
2
 improves from 24.1% to 30.4% when Merton‘s DD is used 
in conjunction with SPREAD.   
We also investigate whether it is appropriate to use corporate bond ratings as a 
measure of default risk. Many studies in this literature, including Avramov et al. 
(2006), use corporate bond ratings as a proxy for distress risk. In this paper we show 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and also include a comprehensive list of alternative explanatory variables. 
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that SPREAD and RATING are not perfect substitutes.  In fact, in Table 2.4 we show 
that there is much variation in credit spreads within a rating group.  The correlation 
between credit spreads and ratings is only 0.45. AA- bonds, for instance, have an 
average credit spread of 84.30 basis points with a standard deviation of 43.93 basis 
points.  A one standard deviation move in credit spreads would firmly take an AA- 
bond‘s rating to a BBB+ rating which is 4 rating levels down. These results indicate 
that measuring default risk through company ratings can yield misleading results.  
This intuition is further supported by hazard regressions in columns 8 and 9 of Table 
2.5. Pseudo R
2
 improves from 23.6% to 30.5% when RATING is used in conjunction 
with SPREAD.   
In Table 2.6, we show that adding SPREAD to Altman and Ohlson specifications 
also improves pseudo R
2
 values.  SPREAD has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant in both models.  Finally when we include all of the variables in Table 2.7, 
SPREAD is statistically significant and improves the pseudo R
2
 when included.  The 
analyses suggest that credit spread is an important predictor of corporate defaults and 
contains information related to financial distress not found in other measures 
commonly used in the literature. 
 
2.4.2 Credit Spreads and Firm Characteristics  
To see how corporate bond spreads are related to firm characteristics we form 
portfolios based on credit spreads.  Each month from January 1981 through December 
2008, companies in our sample are ranked and put into three portfolios based on the 
value of their credit spreads in the previous month.  As described earlier, credit 
                                                                                                                                                                                
15
 McFadden‘s pseudo R2 is calculated as 1 − L1/L0, where L1 is the log likelihood of the estimated 
 24 
 
spreads are value-weighted averages of firms‘ outstanding bond spreads in a given 
month. For each portfolio, we calculate average book-to-market, size, momentum, 
and beta values for all the companies in that portfolio in a given month.  Table 2.8 
reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and value-weighted average 
monthly returns for credit spread portfolios.  Credit spreads vary negatively with firm 
size and positively with book-to-market. The relationship with momentum is not 
monotonic, but the difference in past returns between the low and the high credit 
spread portfolios is positive and significant.  In contrast to earlier studies, we find that 
equity returns increase monotonically with  
credit spreads.  
 
2.4.3 Credit Spreads and Equity Returns 
In this section we examine how corporate bond spreads are related to future realized 
equity returns.  In particular we test whether stocks with high default risk as measured 
by credit spreads have anomalously low returns after controlling for standard risk 
factors.  In the analyses that follow, we create two related but distinct proxies of 
credit risk.  First, we use credit spreads, calculated as the difference between the 
corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate, to proxy 
for aggregate default risk. Second, we use credit spreads that are net of expected 
losses to proxy for each firm‘s exposure to the systematic component of default risk.  
In order to calculate credit spreads that are net of expected losses we adopt a 
procedure used by Driessen et al. (2007), Elton et al. (2001) and Campello, Chen and 
Zhang (2004):  
                                                                                                                                                                                
model and L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. 
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1 1 1 1t tNetSpread PD L PD Spread           (2.7) 
 
In Equation (2.7), NetSpread is the corporate bond spread net of expected losses, PD 
is the physical probability of default, L is the loss rate in the event of default, and 
Spread is the corporate bond credit spread calculated as the difference between the 
corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. In 
Equation (2.7), we assume that default losses are incurred at maturity.  We use CHS-
score described in Section 2.2 to calculate physical probabilities of default.  We 
follow Elton et al. (2001) and Driessen et al. (2007), and use historical loss rates 
reported in Altman and Kishmore (1998) by rating category.  The loss rates vary from 
32% for AAA-rated firms to 62% for CCC-rated firms. 
We sort stocks into deciles each January from 1981 through 2008, according to the 
two distress measures calculated using corporate spreads. The stocks in each decile 
portfolio are held for a year.  As before, if a delisting return is available we use the 
delisting return, otherwise we use the last available return in CRSP.  To save space 
we only report returns for the top and bottom, and the difference between top and 
bottom deciles.  The return results are reported in Table 2.9.  The results under ‗Bond 
Spreads‘ on the left hand side use credit spreads calculated as the difference between 
the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. The 
results under ‗Bond Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses‘ on the right hand side use 
credit spreads that are net of expected losses.  
Our results challenge those obtained in the previous studies. Using credit spreads, 
as a measure of default risk, the difference in raw returns between the highest and 
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lowest default risk portfolios is 0.071% per month and statistically insignificant.  The 
intercepts from the market and the 4-factor models are also economically and 
statistically insignificant.  We find similar results when firms are sorted based on their 
exposures to the systematic component of default risk. The 4-factor monthly alphas 
for a portfolio formed by going long stocks in the highest distress portfolio and short 
stocks in the lowest distress risk portfolio are -0.199% and -0.067% using credit 
spreads and using credit spreads net of expected losses respectively.   
There is a positive relationship between credit spreads and raw equity returns, but 
the return of the high minus low credit spread portfolio is not statistically significant. 
CAPM and 4-factor regressions show that alphas are further subsumed in all credit 
spread portfolios suggesting that default risk is captured mainly by the market factor 
and partly by the size and the value factors.  The size and value factors have 
statistically significant positive loadings for the high minus low credit risk portfolio, 
using either measure, suggesting that these factors are related to default risk. In 4-
factor regressions the momentum factor has a negative and statistically significant 
loading in the high minus low credit risk portfolio regressions, consistent with the 
notion that poor performers of the past are likely to be today‘s distressed firms.   
Ranking stocks on their real-world default probabilities, as done in Dichev 
(1998) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), implicitly assumes that high 
default probability stocks also have high exposure to the systematic component of 
default risk. Using corporate spreads we explicitly account for the systematic 
component in the risk of distress. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to 
explicitly rank equity returns according to firms‘ exposures to the systematic 
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component of default risk. Overall, the results suggest that there is no evidence of 
default risk being negatively priced.  
 
2.4.4 Robustness Checks 
As we are using average credit spreads for each firm, to ensure that our results are not 
biased one way or another, in this section we consider the impact of bond liquidity 
and maturity on bond spreads and equity returns.  In particular we want to make sure 
that our results are not contaminated by the fact that corporate spreads also reflect 
information not related to a firm‘s credit risk.  Although credit risk makes up a 
significant portion of corporate spreads as discussed in Section 2.4, both liquidity and 
maturity have also been shown to be important components.
16
  We repeat the analyses 
in the previous section but explicitly control for liquidity and maturity by double 
sorting companies first by liquidity and maturity and then by credit spreads.   
 We use some of the proxies utilized by Longstaff et al. (2005) in their study to 
measure corporate bond liquidity.
17
  A dummy variable is given each month a value 
of one or zero depending on the characteristics of the underlying bond.  We then add 
up the dummy variables to come up with an overall liquidity score.  The first proxy is 
used to measure general availability of the bond issue in the market.  If the 
outstanding market value of a bond is larger than the median market value of all 
bonds, then the dummy variable is assigned a value of one.  The second proxy is the 
age of the bond and parallels the notion of on-the-run and off-the-run bonds in 
treasury markets, with on-the-run bonds being more liquid.  If the age of a bond is 
                                                          
16
 See for instance Elton et al. (2001), Huang and Huang (2003) and Longstaff et. al (2005). 
17
 For a small subset of our sample, we have bid-ask, volume and turnover information.  We carried out 
similar analyses described in this section and found qualitatively similar results.  
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less than the median age of all bonds, then the dummy variable is assigned a value of 
one.  The third proxy is the time to maturity of the bond.  It has been shown that there 
are maturity clienteles for corporate bonds and that shorter-maturity corporate bonds 
tend to be more liquid than longer-maturity bonds.  If the time to maturity of a bond is 
less than seven years then the dummy variable is assigned a value of one. The fourth 
proxy that we use is a dummy variable for bonds rated by major rating agencies such 
as S&P and Moody‘s.  If a bond is rated, then it is more likely to be liquid and the 
dummy variable is assigned a value of one.  The maximum liquidity value assigned to 
a bond is four and the minimum liquidity value is zero.  
We divide our sample into three liquidity groups based on the liquidity score, and 
calculate average spread and one month ahead equity returns.  The average spread for 
illiquid bonds is 50 basis points higher than for liquid bonds, and the difference is 
statistically significant.  The difference for equity returns, on the other hand, is 
relatively small and insignificant.  Portfolio returns are summarized in Table 2.10.  To 
save space, we only report the differences between the high and low credit spread 
portfolios within each liquidity group.  The difference in raw returns between the 
highest and lowest credit spread portfolios as well as the alphas from the market and 
the 4-factor models are economically and statistically insignificant.  This is true 
regardless of whether the underlying bonds are liquid or illiquid.  These results 
indicate that liquidity effects are unlikely to be driving our findings. 
To control for the impact of bond maturity, we split our sample into four maturity 
buckets: 1 to 4, 4 to 7, 7 to 11, and greater than 11 years.  For each firm we calculate 
a weighted (by market value) average of bond spread within each maturity group.  We 
treat each company–maturity spread as a distinct observation.  Then, within each 
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maturity bucket, we form three portfolios based on credit spreads.  Returns for these 
portfolios are reported in Table 2.11. In all maturity buckets, the differences in raw 
returns as well as differences in alphas from the market and the 4-factor models, 
between the highest and lowest credit spread portfolios are economically and 
statistically insignificant.  Since the uniform ranking of equity portfolio returns with 
respect to credit spreads yield similar patterns across different time-to-maturity 
groups, we conclude that our findings are not impacted by using an average credit 
spread. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the pricing of default risk in equity returns.  Our 
contribution to this literature is three-fold.  First, we show that the distress risk 
anomaly is an amalgamation of other anomalies and return relationships previously 
documented in the literature.  Second, ours is the first paper to use corporate bond 
spreads to measure the ex-ante probability of default risk.  We show that in hazard 
rate regressions, credit spreads drive out the significance of most of the other 
measures that are used to predict corporate defaults and significantly improve the 
pseudo R
2
 values in all specifications.  Third, contrary to previous findings, we show 
that default risk is not priced negatively in the cross section of equity returns. We sort 
firms according to their exposures to the systematic component of default risk as well 
as their aggregate default risk.  To the best of our knowledge we are the first to 
explicitly rank equity returns according to firms‘ exposures to the systematic 
component of default risk.  Portfolios sorted both on credit spreads and on credit 
spreads net of expected losses have positive raw returns but do not deliver significant 
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positive or negative returns after controlling for well known risk factors. Our findings 
challenge the previous studies that have found an anomalous relationship between 
credit risk and equity returns. The analyses in this paper take the right step towards 
finding a more appropriate measure of systematic default risk that can explain the 
cross section of equity returns in line with the rational expectations theory. 
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APPENDIX  
Here we explain the details of the variables used to construct distress measures.  
Quarterly COMPUSTAT data is used to compute all accounting variables.  Our first 
measure is Altman‘s z-score, which is defined as the following: 
 
z-score = 1.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 1.0 WCTA RETA EBITTA METL STA  
 
WCTA is the working capital (data40 – data49) divided by total assets.  We follow 
CHS 2008 to adjust total assets calculated as total liabilities (data54) + market equity 
+ 0.1*(market equity – book equity).  Book equity is as defined in Davis, Fama, and 
French (2000). RETA is the ratio of retained earnings (data58) to total assets.  EBITTA 
is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (data21 - data5 + data31) to total 
assets, METL is the ratio of market equity to total liabilities, and STA is the ratio of 
sales (data12) to total assets.  Our second measure is Ohlson‘s o-score, defined as: 
 
-score 1.32 0.407 log( ) 6.03 1.43 
0.076 1.72 2.37 1.83 
0.285 0.521 
o SIZE TLTA WCTA
CLCA OENEG NITA FUTL
INTWO CHIN
 
 
where SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, TLTA is the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets, CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities (data49) to 
current assets (data40), OENEG is a dummy variable equal to one if total liabilities 
exceeds total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net income (data69) to 
total assets, FUTL is the ratio of funds from operations (data23) to total liabilities, 
INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if net income was negative for the past two 
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years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is change in net income over the last quarter: 
(NItNIt−1)/(|NIt| + |NIt−1|). 
The third measure we use is the CHS-score: 
 
-   9.164 20.264 1.416 
7.129 1.411 0.045 
2.132 0.075 0.058 
t t t
t t t
t t t
CHS score NIMTAAVG TLMTA
EXRETAVG SIGMA RSIZE
CASHMTA MB PRICE
 
 
where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of 
net income (data69) to total assets:  
2
1, 12 1, 3 10, 1212
1
...
1t t t t t t
NIMTAAVG NIMTA NIMTA  
EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns 
relative to the S&P 500 index: 
11
1, 12 1 1212
1
...
1t t t t
EXRETAVG EXRET EXRET  
The weighting coefficient is set to  = 2−1/3, such that the weight is halved each 
quarter. 
TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities (data69) to total assets.  SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months.  SIGMA is coded as 
missing if there are fewer than 5 observations.  RSIZE is the log ratio of market 
capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index.  CASHMTA is the ratio of the 
value of cash and short term investments (data36) to the value of total assets.  MB is 
the market-to-book ratio.  Book equity is as defined in Davis, Fama, and French 
(2000).  PRICE is the log price per share truncated from above at $15. All variables 
are winsorized using a 1/99 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.  
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We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) to calculate our fourth distress 
measure, Merton‘s distance-to-default.  The market equity value of a company is 
modeled as a call option on the company‘s assets: 
  
1 2
2
1
2 1
( ) ( ) (1 )
log( / ) ( ( / 2))
T rT T
E A A
A A
A
A
V V e N d Xe N d e V
V X r T
d
T
d d T
 
Above EV  is the market value of a firm.  AV  is the value of firm‘s assets. X is the face 
value of debt maturing at time T.  r is the risk-free rate and  is the dividend rate 
expressed in terms of AV .  A  is the volatility of the value of assets, which is related 
to equity volatility through the following equation: 
 
1( ) /
T
E A A EV e N d V  
 
We simultaneously solve the above two equations to find the values of AV  and A .  
We use the market value of equity for EV and short-term plus one half long-term book 
debt to proxy for the face value of debt X (data45+1/2*data51).  E  is the standard 
deviation of daily equity returns over the past 3 months.  T equals one year, and r is 
the one-year treasury bill rate. The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the prior year‘s 
common and preferred dividends (data19 + data21) divided by the market value of 
assets.  We use the Newton method to simultaneously solve the two equations above.  
For starting values for the unknown variables we use, A EV V X , and 
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( )A E E EV V X .    Once we determine asset values, AV , we then compute asset 
returns as in Hillegeist et al. (2004): 
 
, , 1
, 1
max ,A t A tt
A t
V Dividends V
r
V
 
 
As expected returns cannot be negative, if asset returns are below zero they are set to 
the risk-free rate.
18
  Merton‘s distance-to-default is finally computed as:  
 
 
2log / / 2A A
A
V X T
MertonDD
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 We obtain similar results if we use a 6% equity premium instead of asset returns as in CHS (2008). 
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Table 2.3: Stock Characteristics and Default Risk 
 
Table 2.3 shows the 4-factor alphas for distress portfolios before and after controlling for idiosyncratic 
volatility, profitability and leverage. Distress portfolios are formed by sorting stocks into five groups 
each January from 1981 to 2008 according to the CHS probability of default.  Then within each default 
group we first sort stocks based on the previous year‘s idiosyncratic volatility into five groups creating a 
total of 25 portfolios. The five distress portfolios are averaged over each of the idiosyncratic volatility 
portfolios to account for the impact of idiosyncratic volatility. Finally we calculate the 4-factor alphas for 
the distress portfolios as well as the high distress-low distress hedge portfolio. The same procedure is 
repeated for profitability and leverage characteristics and we report only the 4-factor alphas for distress 
portfolios as well as hedge portfolios that have been controlled for the effects of the aforementioned 
stock characteristics. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model as 
in AHXZ (2006). Profitability is measured using NIMTAVG, and leverage is measured using TLMTA. 
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, and TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 4-Factor Returns 
4-Factor Alphas (*100) Before/After Controlling for Stock Characteristics 
 
L 2 3 4 H H-L 
Before controls 
0.079 0.133 0.014 -0.158 -0.803 
-0.71 (1.94)* -0.13 -1.03    (3.29)*** 
-0.882  
(2.71)*** 
  
Controlling for Idio Volatility 
-0.091   -0.219 -0.304 -0.279 -0.627 
-0.62 (1.88)*   (2.73)*** (2.01)**    (3.17)*** 
-0.537 
(2.08)** 
  
Controlling for Profitability 
0.012 -0.104 -0.006 0.008  -0.251 
(0.14)   (1.89)*  (0.08) (0.08)  (1.74)* 
-0.263 
(1.39) 
  
Controlling for Leverage 
0.072 -0.006  0.004 -0.122  -0.545 
(0.98)  (0.1)* (0.05)  (1.1)    (3.01)*** 
 -0.617     
(2.93)*** 
 
Panel B: Stock Characteristics 
 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.032 0.045 0.019 
Profitability 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.011 -0.022 
Leverage 0.216 0.333 0.456 0.550 0.605 0.389 
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Table 2.4: Credit spread by rating categories 
 
Table 2.4 reports summary statistics for credit spreads by rating category. The benchmark risk-free yield is 
the yield of the closest maturity treasury. We include only straight fixed-coupon corporate bonds for the 
January 1974-December 2008 time period. Bonds for financial firms are excluded. The spreads are given in 
annualized basis points and ratings in this sample come from Standard and Poor‘s. 
 
Rating Category 
(S&P) 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Spread (bps)   
Std Dev Spread 
(bps) 
AAA 1157 64.30 27.47 
AA+ 316 87.58 32.07 
AA 2973 77.51 35.70 
AA- 2966 84.30 43.93 
A+ 5155 96.99 45.77 
A 7778 102.28 51.99 
A- 5397 112.24 61.65 
BBB+ 4801 124.45 67.24 
BBB 4882 146.47 88.86 
BBB- 3559 185.86 113.99 
BB+ 1224 272.54 142.87 
BB 949 321.31 134.27 
BB- 709 384.52 142.45 
B+ 342 405.91 129.51 
B 266 448.77 156.50 
B- 57 508.09 148.10 
CCC+ 34 455.60 117.19 
CCC 29 583.79 116.17 
All Ratings 42605 133.67 104.39 
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Table 2.5: Bankruptcy Prediction – CHS Covariates, Ratings and Distance-to-Default  
 
Table 2.5 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables.  
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG 
is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the log 
ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to 
the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, PRICE is the log price per share truncated 
from above at $15, DD is Merton‘s distance-to-default. These variables are described in detail in the 
appendix. SPREAD is the corporate bond credit spread calculated as the difference between the corporate 
bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. RATING is the Standard and Poor‘s 
(S&P) corporate rating obtained from COMPUSTAT. Results under ‗All Firms‘ are estimates computed 
using the full sample of defaults with available accounting information.  Results under ‗Firms with bonds‘ 
are estimates computed using the sample of defaults from companies that have issued bonds with available 
accounting information.  Results under ‗CHS sample‘ shows the estimates CHS report in their paper.  
Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo 
R2 values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample Period: 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1963-1998 1981-2008 
NIMTAAVG -25.922 -21.423    -32.518 -26.587 
       (3.08)***     (2.17)**        (17.65)***    (10.17)*** 
TLMTA 1.848  0.864    4.322 3.654 
     (2.34)** (1.01)     (22.82)***  (16.64)*** 
EXRETAVG -8.730     -11.176    -9.51 -11.113 
       (2.92)***      (3.27)***       (12.05)***    (10.38)*** 
SIGMA 1.735 1.038    0.92  1.163 
     (5.13)***   (2.53)**        (6.66)***   (7.44)*** 
RSIZE -0.394 -0.462    0.246 0.167 
      (4.02)***      (4.04)***      (6.18)***  (5.08)*** 
CASHMTA -1.283 -1.050    -4.888 -3.685 
 (0.85) (0.62)       (7.96)***    (6.88)*** 
MB 0.086  0.136    0.099 0.129 
 (0.80)       (1.28)       (6.72)***   (3.46)*** 
PRICE -0.294  0.040    -0.882 -0.657 
 (1.10)       (0.13)      (10.39)***    (7.50)*** 
SPREAD  15.307 26.761      16.14   
       (5.90)***  (10.26)***   (5.73)***   
DD        -0.723     -0.525   
        (7.26)***  (5.88)***   
RATING        
        
CONSTANT -9.430    -10.686    -5.481     -1.548     -2.991 -7.648 -5.882 
      (7.38)***      (6.24)*** (37.12)***   (5.11)***   (8.97)*** (13.66)*** (11.86)*** 
Observations 8096 8096 9117 7248 7248 1282853 136468 
Bankruptcies 94  94  114 55 55 797 548 
Pseudo R
2
        0.276          0.374     0.265       0.241        0.304     0.299       0.255 
Sample Type Firms with 
Bonds 
Firms with  
Bonds 
Firms with 
Bonds 
Firms with 
Bonds 
Firms with 
Bonds 
CHS Sample All Firms 
Table 2.5:  
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Table 2.5 continued: Bankruptcy Prediction – CHS Covariates, Ratings and Distance-to-
Default  
 
Table 2.5 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables.  
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG 
is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the log 
ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to 
the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, PRICE is the log price per share truncated 
from above at $15, DD is Merton‘s distance-to-default. These variables are described in detail in the 
appendix. SPREAD is the corporate bond credit spread calculated as the difference between the corporate 
bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. RATING is the Standard and Poor‘s 
(S&P) corporate rating obtained from COMPUSTAT. Results under ‗All Firms‘ are estimates computed 
using the full sample of defaults with available accounting information.  Results under ‗Firms with bonds‘ 
are estimates computed using the sample of defaults from companies that have issued bonds with available 
accounting information.  Results under ‗CHS sample‘ shows the estimates CHS report in their paper.  
Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo 
R2 values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (10) (11) (12) 
Sample period: 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 
NIMTAAVG     -15.667 -12.039 
      (1.28) (1.40) 
TLMTA       1.890   1.205 
      (1.60)      (2.34)** 
EXRETAVG     -15.753 -16.015 
            (4.31)***         (5.34)*** 
SIGMA     0.692  0.037 
     (0.84) (0.43) 
RSIZE     -0.233 -0.330 
     (1.09) (1.09) 
CASHMTA     -2.064 -2.657 
     (1.11) (1.11) 
MB     -0.009  0.055 
     (0.27) (0.27) 
PRICE     0.022   0.188 
     (0.31) (0.31) 
SPREAD  17.870  15.229  14.600 
       (6.43)***        (4.34)***         (3.19)*** 
DD   -0.666 -0.556 -0.260  -0.302 
        (5.70)***       (6.14)***   (1.74)*   (1.78)* 
RATING 0.410 0.257 0.122 0.015 0.086  -0.014 
   (13.26)***     (6.98)***     (2.47)** (0.30) (1.12) (0.15) 
CONSTANT -9.149 -8.116 -3.154 -3.017 -8.464 -8.286 
   (21.69)***     (18.90)***      (3.78)***      (4.21)***      (3.07)***       (2.74)*** 
Observations 8068 8068 6814 6814 6736 6736 
Bankruptcies 77 77 51 51 51 51 
Pseudo R
2
 0.236 0.305 0.279 0.315 0.351 0.377 
Sample Type 
Firms with 
Bonds 
Firms with  
Bonds 
Firms with  
Bonds 
Firms with 
Bonds 
Firms with 
Bonds 
Firms with 
Bonds 
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Table 2.6: Bankruptcy Prediction – Altman and Ohlson Covariates  
 
Table 2.6 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables. SIZE is 
total assets divided by the consumer price index, TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, WCTA 
is the ratio of working capital to total assets, CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, NITA 
is the ratio of net income to total assets, FUTL is the ratio of funds from operations to total liabilities, CHIN 
is a measure of the change in net income, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if net income was 
negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, OENEG is a dummy variable equal to one if total 
liabilities exceeds total assets and zero otherwise, RETA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets, 
EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, METL is the ratio of market equity 
to total liabilities, STA is the ratio of sales to total assets, and SPREAD is the corporate bond credit spread 
calculated as the difference between the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched 
treasury rate.  These variables are described in detail in the appendix.  Absolute values of z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each 
regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample period: 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 
SIZE  -0.254              -0.208   
     (2.38)**   (1.67)*   
TLTA  20.372 14.304   
      (4.80)***       (3.54)***   
WCTA    0.068  -0.348   
 (0.09) (0.63)   
CLCA  -0.002 -0.112   
  (1.88)* (0.51)   
NITA    6.441   7.126   
 (0.35) (0.35)   
FUTL -8.076   -8.044   
              (1.15) (1.07)   
CHIN  -0.300  -0.355   
              (1.31) (1.37)   
INTWO  0.905  0.600   
      (2.76)*** (1.65)*   
OENEG  1.095 0.904   
   (2.69)** (1.83)*   
WCTA     0.815 0.203 
                (0.77) (0.24) 
RETA    -2.453 -0.530 
        (2.28)** (0.44) 
EBITTA    -24.779 -22.096 
      (1.78)* (1.61) 
METL     -2.947 -1.737 
         (3.31)***    (2.52)** 
STA    28.703 30.320 
   (1.32) (1.46) 
SPREAD  15.011  20.168 
                                                                               (4.02)***         (5.20)*** 
CONSTANT -11.409 -9.640 -2.977 -4.291 
         (6.70)***      (6.29)***      (9.65)***       (8.87)*** 
Observations 6349 6349 5896 5896 
Bankruptcies 51 51 48 48 
Pseudo R
2
 0.245 0.324 0.179 0.277 
Sample Type Firms with Bonds Firms with  Bonds Firms with Bonds Firms with Bonds 
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Table 2.7: Bankruptcy Prediction – All Covariates  
 
Table 2.7 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables.   The 
explanatory variables are all the covariates described in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Absolute values of z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses next to coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each 
regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
Sample period: 1981-2008 1981-2008 
NIMTAAVG 31.04 (1.48) 44.82    (1.89)* 
TLMTA 1.39 (0.12)   4.89 (0.38) 
EXRETAVG -12.93       (2.81)*** -13.98       (2.90)*** 
SIGMA -0.05 (0.04) -1.08 (0.79) 
RSIZE -0.89      (2.47)** -1.15       (3.09)*** 
CASHMTA -6.09          (1.40) -8.31 (1.43) 
MB -0.44      (2.28)** -0.47     (2.31)** 
PRICE -0.06 (0.12)  0.07 (0.12) 
DD -0.31 (1.49) -0.37 (1.52) 
RATING 0.09 (0.86) -0.04 (0.33) 
SIZE  0.82     (2.44)**  1.00       (3.03)*** 
TLTA  -10.48 (0.29) -30.15 (0.71) 
WCTA  0.29 (0.30) -0.17 (0.17) 
CLCA  0.14 (0.65) -0.09 (0.29) 
NITA  -14.29 (1.19) -19.27 (1.35) 
FUTL -2.35 (0.50) -1.84 (0.32) 
CHIN  -0.42    (1.66)* -0.37 (1.38) 
INTWO  0.82    (1.77)* 0.77 (1.52) 
OENEG  2.55         (3.28)*** 3.05       (3.45)*** 
RETA  1.75          (1.06) 1.53 (0.42) 
EBITTA  -1.99 (0.11) -10.74 (0.57) 
STA -0.37 (0.35) -1.38 (0.89) 
METL  40.10 (1.55) 48.21   (1.68)* 
SPREAD   17.97       (3.59)*** 
CONSTANT -14.53 (0.66) -10.57 (1.11) 
Observations 5175 5175 
Bankruptcies 43 43 
Pseudo R
2
 0.415 0.455 
Sample Type Firms with Bonds Firms with Bonds 
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Table 2.8: Stock characteristics and credit-spreads 
 
In table 2.8 we report summary statistics of stock characteristics for firms belonging to three credit-spread 
portfolios. Each month from January 1981 through December 2008, we rank and put stocks in to three 
portfolios based on their value-weighted credit spreads. We then compute cross-sectional average values and 
standard deviations for various stock characteristics in each group. Size is the market value of equity in 
millions of dollars. Book-to-market (BM) is calculated as the ratio of book equity in the previous calendar 
month to market equity in the previous month. Prev Return is the compounded raw returns of the past 12 
months. We calculate each firm's Beta for month t by regressing each stock's monthly returns on the value-
weighted NYSE/AMEX index during the past 36 months.  
 
 
Spread Rank Variable    Mean   Std Dev 
Low 
Return 0.00986 0.0655 
Size 26,237 64,575 
BM 0.48695 0.30274 
Prev Return 0.17002 0.24911 
Beta 0.93860 0.48353 
Intermediate 
Return 0.01307 0.07279 
Size 14,130 46449 
BM 0.61622 0.42316 
Prev Return 0.17671 0.27025 
Beta 0.98480 0.49288 
High 
Return 0.01359 0.10542 
Size 5,927 21647 
BM 0.83271 0.64552 
Prev Return 0.15031 0.40985 
Beta 1.09971 0.64248 
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Table 2.9: Monthly equity returns for credit spread portfolios  
 
In table 2.9 we report CAPM and 4-factor regression results for distress portfolios. We sort stocks into deciles 
each January from 1981 through December 2008, according to their credit spreads obtained at the beginning 
of December of the most recent year ended. We compute the value-weighted return for these decile portfolios 
on a monthly basis and regress the portfolio return in excess of risk-free rate on the market (MKT), size 
(SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors. The factors are obtained from Ken French‘s website. 
The results under ‗Bond Spreads‘ on the left hand side use credit spreads calculated as the difference between 
the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. The results under ‗Bond 
Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses‘ on the right hand side use credit spreads that are net of expected 
losses. The ‗Bond Spread‘ variable is a measure of the total default risk while the ‗Bond Spreads In Excess of 
Expected Losses‘ proxy for only the systematic portion of default risk. We report regression results for only 
the top and bottom decile portfolios to save space.  Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
 
 
 
Monthly Equity Returns For Default Risk Portfolios 
Bond Spreads    Bond Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses 
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM      Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM  
10th   0.497            10th   0.474          
  (2.01)***              (1.88)**          
   0.161     0.766              0.129     0.783        
  (1.19) (25.79)***            (0.95) (26.074)***        
   0.140     0.851 -0.246  0.191 -0.074        0.103    0.871   -0.234   0.212  -0.078  
  (1.19) (30.27)*** (6.77)*** (4.39)*** (2.83)***      (0.87) (30.71)***  ( 6.35)*** (4.83)*** (2.98)***  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM      Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM  
90th   0.568            90th   0.643          
  (1.17)              (1.34)          
   -0.013     1.323             0.075     1.291        
  (0.41) (18.197)***            (0.23) (17.84)***        
  -0.059     1.441     0.695   0.919 -0.397       0.036     1.407   0.684     0.910 -0.400  
  (0.22)* (22.40)***  ( 8.34)***  (9.22)*** (6.66)***      (0.14) (21.99)*** (8.25)***   ( 9.18)*** (6.75)***  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM      Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM  
90th - 10th  0.071        90th - 10th  0.169          
  (0.19)          (0.46)          
  -0.174   0.557         -0.054   0.507        
  (0.50) (7.31)***         (0.16)  (6.76)***        
  -0.199  0.591     0.941   0.728 -0.323      -0.067   0.536   0.918    0.698 -0.322  
  (0.68) (8.51)*** (10.46)*** (6.77)*** (5.03)***      (0.23)  (7.79)*** (10.29)***   (6.55)*** (5.05)***  
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Table 2.10: Monthly equity returns bond liquidity / credit spread portfolios  
 
In table 2.10, we report monthly equity returns of credit-spread sorted portfolios for companies associated 
with different levels of bond market liquidity.  For each bond we compute a liquidity measure using 4 proxies 
as described in the text. We value weight the liquidity scores of the bonds that belong to the same firm and 
assign each firm a single bond market liquidity measure in a given month. Weights are the outstanding market 
values of the bonds. In a similar fashion we calculate firm level credit spreads for each firm on a monthly 
basis. Every month, we group firms into three buckets based on their bond market liquidity level.  Then within 
each bond market liquidity bucket, firms are grouped in to three portfolios based on their value weighted 
credit spreads. For each credit risk portfolio we calculate value weighted equity returns and report raw return 
differences, CAPM and 4-factor model based monthly alphas between high credit spread and low credit 
spread portfolios. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Bond Liquidity Rank Spread Rank Mean t-stat 
High 
Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0500 0.22 
CAPM Alpha H-L -0.0810 -0.34 
4-factor Alpha H-L -0.0290 0.14 
2 
Raw    Alpha H-L 0.1388   0.54  
CAPM Alpha H-L 0.0200  0.08 
4-factor Alpha H-L 0.0165   0.07 
Low 
Raw    Alpha H-L -0.1184  -0.49 
CAPM Alpha H-L -0.2260  -0.96 
4-factor Alpha H-L -0.3190  -1.49 
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Table 2.11: Monthly equity returns for credit spread/maturity portfolios  
 
In table 2.11, we report returns of credit-spread sorted portfolios in different time-to-maturity groups. 
Maturity is the remaining time to maturity in years of the bonds. We allocate each bond to one of four 
maturity groups: Bucket 1 includes bonds with maturities less than 4 years but more than 1 year, Bucket 2 
includes bonds with maturities greater than 4 years but less than 7 years, Bucket 3 includes bonds with 
maturities greater than 7 years but less than 11 years, and Bucket 4 includes bonds with maturities greater than 
11 years. Each month from January 1981 through December 2008 bonds are assigned to four groups based on 
their time to maturity. For each firm we calculate four different credit-spread values: one for each maturity 
bucket.  All credit spreads are value-weighted with respect to the market values of a firm‘s outstanding bonds. 
Then within each maturity bucket firms are assigned to three portfolios based on their credit spreads. In all 
time-to-maturity buckets we calculate value-weighted subsequent realized monthly equity returns for each 
credit-spread portfolio. In each maturity bucket we report raw return differences, CAPM and 4-factor model 
based monthly alphas between high credit spread and low credit spread portfolios. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Maturity Groups Spread rank       Mean      t-stat 
1<=TTM<=4 Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0599 0.21 
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.033 -0.12 
  4-factor Alpha H-L -0.096 -0.41 
4<TTM<=7 Raw    Alpha H-L -0.0229 0 
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.159 -0.69 
  4-factor Alpha H-L -0.073 -0.36 
7<TTM<=11 Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0799  0.02  
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.151 -0.62 
  4-factor Alpha H-L -0.137 -0.6 
11<TTM Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0978 0.39 
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.037 -0.15 
  4-factor Alpha H-L 0.099 0.47 
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Chapter III 
 
 
 
Corporate Reputation and Cost of Debt
19
 
 
Reputation is an intangible, and intangibles are hard to quantify.  Theoretical papers on 
the subject have shown that reputations emerge from information asymmetries.  The 
seminal work in this area was written by Milgrom and Roberts (1982).  Asymmetric 
information about a player‘s true type gives rise to reputation, a formalized belief about the 
player‘s type.  Milgrom and Roberts state that ―where individuals are unsure about one 
another‘s options or motivation…, we would expect to see reputations develop…. examples 
in economics arise in credit relationships.‖  But this impact of reputation on credit 
relationships has never been fully quantified.  Reputation is an elusive concept that 
encompasses perceptions of many aspects of the firm – the quality, integrity and character 
of a firm‘s managers, the innovativeness of the firm, the quality of its products, the firm‘s 
ability to attract, retain and train talented workers, to name a few.  There is, however, a 
measure of these perceptions that comes from Fortune magazine.  Each year, Fortune 
magazine surveys industry experts, along these dimensions and more, in order to gauge a 
firm‘s reputation – that intangible way in which the company is perceived by others.   
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In this paper, we show that a firm‘s reputation plays an important role in determining 
its cost of debt.  After controlling for tangible measures of credit risk and other known 
determinants of credit spreads, we find a robust inverse relationship between a firm‘s 
reputation, as measured by the Fortune survey, and the credit spread on its bonds.  By 
explicitly accounting for an intangible element of credit risk, we substantially improve upon 
the existing literature which, relying on more tangible factors, concludes that a large 
component of credit spread variation remains unexplained (see, for instance, Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 2001).  We also show that the Fortune reputation measure 
is a good ex ante predictor of corporate failure, improving upon standard measures used in 
the literature. 
The finance literature has, to a large extent, equated a firm‘s reputation with its 
repayment history (e.g., Diamond 1989, 1991).  In this view, a firm starts its life without 
any reputation, and accumulates one over time with consistent and timely repayment of its 
debt obligations.  Diamond suggests that a reputation acquired in this manner determines 
firm borrowing costs, with more reputable firms enjoying more access to capital and at a 
lower cost.  From this perspective, reputation should be fully captured by the firm‘s 
repayment track record or its credit rating.  This notion is consistent with Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982) who believe that, through its actions, a firm can shape its reputation.  But 
non-payment of debt is a rather extreme outcome.  Looking at consistency of repayment 
alone makes it difficult to distinguish healthy firms with similar repayment records.  Firms 
may adopt a wide range of other actions that influence how its credit worthiness is 
perceived.  A firm may hire quality managers or take a conservative approach to risk 
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management, for example, leading it to be perceived as a high quality firm in terms of its 
credit risk.     
Intuition also suggests that a firm‘s credit worthiness is determined by more than its 
repayment track record.  Take a lender reviewing an application for a loan.  It may collect 
both ―hard‖ and ―soft‖ information about the applicant.  Hard information is information 
that is documentable and verifiable, such as a firm‘s repayment history, as contemplated by 
Diamond (1989, 1991).  Hard information can be quantified and saved in the lender‘s files.  
Soft information refers to any information that is not easily documentable or verifiable.  It 
tends to involve qualitative information requiring subjective assessment.  Examples of soft 
information include a lender‘s judgment about the quality of the firm‘s managers and 
products, the innovativeness of the firm, and the talent of its workforce.  Both hard and soft 
information can play a valuable role in screening loan applicants and determining 
borrowing costs (Stein 2002).   
The finance literature focuses on the ―hard‖ aspect of credit risk (such as repayment 
history, credit rating, etc.), overlooking its ―soft‖ aspect (such as reputation).  This neglect 
of the intangible element may explain why the literature has not been very successful with 
the pricing of credit risk.  Prior studies have been able to explain only a small fraction of 
the variation in credit spreads (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 
2001; Duffee 1999; Amato and Remolona 2003; Elton et al. 2001).   These studies have 
mostly relied upon hard information such as balance sheet and market data, assigning no 
explicit role to such intangible factors as firm reputation.  These studies conclude that there 
is a large component of credit spread variation that remains unexplained.       
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In this paper, we show that by incorporating an important intangible, firm reputation, 
into these models, we improve our understanding of credit risk.  Our measure of reputation 
comes from Fortune magazine‘s annual ranking of ―Most Admired Companies.‖ To 
produce its list, Fortune magazine conducts an annual survey in which industry experts are 
asked to rank companies along eight attributes.  The executives, directors, and analysts who 
participate in the survey are from the same industry as the companies being measured and 
have expert knowledge of the product markets and abilities of the management teams of the 
companies they assess.  The survey is widely used by academics in a number of disciplines 
to measure corporate reputation (see, e.g., Davies 2003; and Fombrun, Gardberg and Sever 
1999).  The reputation scores arising out of the Fortune survey contain information that is 
not captured by balance sheet or market data or by the other tangible factors commonly 
employed in the finance literature.   
We find that the Fortune reputation score substantially improves our ability to explain 
the cross-section of corporate bond credit spreads.  A higher reputation score leads to lower 
monthly credit spreads, after controlling for standard credit-risk predictors.  We find the 
same relationship when using year-over-year changes in variables.  A half-point (0.5) 
improvement in the reputation score, or moving up one quintile in the reputation rankings, 
reduces the cost of debt capital by 10 to 20 basis points, even after taking into account the 
impact of all other firm-level and macro-level variables that are known to affect credit risk.  
Moreover, the impact of the reputation score on credit spreads varies with the information 
environment.  The effect of reputation is more pronounced for firms that are more opaque.  
These findings suggest that the Fortune reputation score captures an intangible element of 
credit risk that is an important factor in bond pricing.   
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The Fortune reputation score helps to explain credit spreads because it captures an 
aspect of default not captured by the standard tangible measures: the reputation score 
conveys ―soft‖ information about whether a company will fail to honor its commitments.  
We find a highly significant inverse relationship between our measure of reputation and 
corporate failures, even after controlling for credit rating, Merton‘s distance-to-default 
parameter, and a comprehensive list of accounting and market variables used by Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008, hereafter CHS).  While these other factors have been found to 
predict failures, they reflect only tangible aspects of a firm.  We have identified a failure 
predictor that is derived from industry experts‘ perception of the firm and thus contributes 
soft information about default risk.     
Our finding shows that intangibles are important in bond pricing, and indicates that the 
Diamond approach to measuring reputation is incomplete.  This finding that an intangible 
affects the cost of debt is consistent with studies in other lines of the finance literature.  
Compared to the fixed-income literature, the equities literature has given more attention to 
the role of intangibles in the cost of capital.  Previous studies have shown that stock returns 
are impacted by investors‘ perceptions of the company, such as whether the firm is an 
―admired‖ or ―glamor‖ company (Anginer and Statman 2010; Statman, Fisher and Anginer 
2008; Sherfrin and Statman 1995; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishney 1994; Del Guercio 
1996; Hankins, Flannery and Nimalendran 2008).  Studies have also found that stock prices 
are impacted by employee satisfaction (Edmans 2010), advertising (Chan, Lakonishok and 
Sougiannis 2001; Chemmanur and Yan 2009), R&D (Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Chan, 
Lakonishok and Sougiannis 2001), patents (Deng, Lev and Narin 1999), software 
development (Aboody and Lev 1998) and firm governance (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
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2003).  But despite a growing recognition that intangibles affect equity prices, little is 
known about how intangibles impact the debt market.  That appears to be changing.  Bauer, 
Derwall and Hann (2009), for example, examine how a company‘s relationship with its 
employees impacts its cost of debt.
20
    In the consumer context, Keys et al. (2010a, 2010b, 
2009) and Rajan, Seru and Vig (2010) show empirically that soft information can play a 
significant role in mortgage lenders‘ credit decisions.   
Economic models show that it can make sense for firms to take actions counter to their 
short-term interests, such as by spending on advertising, offering money back guarantees, 
or engaging in socially responsible activities, in order to establish a reputation from which 
they can profit in the future (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Mailath and Samuelson 
2001).    This view has even given rise to the notion that there is a market for reputations 
among firms (Kreps 1990; Tadelis 1999, 2002a, 2002b; and Mailath and Samuelson 2001).  
A related strand of this literature examines the role of reputation as an enforcement 
mechanism in commercial trade between firms.  Reputational concerns facilitate 
commercial transactions by encouraging firms to perform even in the absence of formal 
contract enforcement (see MacLeod 2007; Klein and Leffler 1981).  Recent empirical work 
shows that reputation is a qualitatively important determinant of default rates under 
commercial contracts, deterring short-term opportunism (Macchiavello and Morjaria 2010; 
Banerjee and Duflo 2000; McMillan and Woodruff 1999).   
Notwithstanding these attempts to incorporate intangibles, however, the fixed-income 
literature has, for the most part, persisted with the Diamond (1989, 1991) approach of 
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is based on a wider set of components. 
 59 
 
equating a firm‘s reputation with its repayment history.  If the narrow Diamond approach to 
reputation is correct, credit ratings should provide a perfect measure of default risk.  The 
empirical literature, however, has shown that they do not.  In this paper, we show that the 
Fortune score conveys information about credit risk not captured by credit ratings or other 
measures traditionally used in the finance literature, and improves assessment of default 
risk. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.1 describes the Fortune 
reputation score and the other data used in this study, and gives an overview of the 
methodology used.  Section 3.2 provides descriptive statistics.  Section 3.3 establishes that 
the Fortune reputation score is not merely another proxy for default risk.  Our main results 
appear in Section 3.4.  Section 3.5 concludes.   
3.1 Data and Methodology 
We measure firm reputation by using Fortune magazine‘s annual ranking of ―Most 
Admired Companies.‖  Fortune magazine has published an annual survey of company 
reputations since 1983.  Each year, Fortune asks senior executives, directors and securities 
analysts to rate the ten largest companies in their industry on eight attributes of reputation, 
using a scale from zero (poor) to ten (excellent).  The attributes are quality of management; 
quality of products or services; innovativeness; long-term investment value; financial 
soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people; responsibility to the 
community and the environment; and wise use of corporate assets.  The overall score of a 
company is the mean of the ratings on the eight attributes.  This overall mean score is used 
to rank companies by reputation.  Our approach follows that taken by Anginer and Statman 
(2010) and Statman, Fisher and Anginer (2008) in the equities literature.  Those studies 
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compare the stock performance of high-scoring companies to the stock performance of low-
scoring companies.  In this paper, we compare the cost of debt capital incurred by high-
scoring companies to the cost of debt capital incurred by low-scoring companies.  
The Fortune surveys are completed by respondents around September 30
th
 of each year, 
and the results are published during the first quarter of the subsequent year.  Since we are 
interested in the opinions of respondents at the time they are surveyed (as opposed to the 
time the information becomes public), we match a company‘s Fortune reputation score with 
its firm-level data as of September 30 of the preceding year.   We also construct portfolios 
on that date.  The Fortune survey published in early 2007 includes 590 companies.  In 
conducting the survey, Fortune asked 10,000 senior executives, directors and securities 
analysts to rate the ten largest companies in their industries on eight attributes of reputation 
(from zero (poor) to ten (excellent)).  In 2007, FedEx Corporation ranked highest with an 
overall score of 8.70, followed by CHS with an overall score of 8.67 and Procter & Gamble 
with an overall score of 8.58.  Dana Corporation ranked at the very bottom with an overall 
score of 3.09.  Repeating our analyses using each of the attributes individually yields results 
that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results utilizing the overall Fortune 
score.  The different attributes are highly correlated, suggesting that there is common 
component driving all attributes.
21
 
Firm-level accounting and price information are obtained from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP for the 1983–2007 time period.  We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 through 
6999) from the sample.  To avoid the influence of microstructure noise, we also exclude 
firms priced less than one dollar.  It is important for us to control for tangible determinants 
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of credit spreads, especially those that relate to credit risk.  We use a number of distress 
measures that have been previously used in the literature (see, for instance, Anginer and 
Yildizhan 2010; Campbell et al. 2008).  The data items used to construct distress measures 
are explained in detail in the appendix. 
Corporate bond data used in this study come from three separate databases: the Lehman 
Brothers Fixed Income Database (Lehman) for the period 1983 to 1997, the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners Database (NAIC) for the period 1994 to 2006, and 
the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system dataset from 2003 to 2007.  
We also use the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) for bond descriptions.  Our 
sample includes all U.S. corporate bonds listed in the above datasets that satisfy a set of 
selection criteria commonly used in the corporate bond literature (see, e.g., Anginer and 
Yildizhan 2010; and Anginer and Warburton 2011).  We exclude all bonds that are matrix-
priced (rather than market-priced) from the sample.  We remove all bonds with equity or 
derivative features (i.e. callable, puttable, and convertible bonds), bonds with warrants, and 
bonds with floating interest rates.  Finally, we eliminate all bonds that have less than one 
year to maturity. 
For all selected bonds, we extract beginning-of-month credit spreads calculated as the 
difference between the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity-matched 
treasury rate.  There are a number of extreme observations for the variables constructed 
from the bond datasets.  To ensure that statistical results are not heavily influenced by 
outliers, we set all observations higher than the 99th percentile value of a given variable to 
the 99th percentile value.  All values lower than the first percentile of each variable are 
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 We also repeated our analysis using the first principal component of the attributes and obtained results that 
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winsorized in the same manner.  For each firm, we calculate a value-weighted average of 
that firm‘s outstanding bond spreads, using market values of the bonds as weights.  Since 
Fortune magazine calculates reputation scores once a year, at the end of each September, 
we use the average of monthly firm-level spreads between consecutive Octobers to assign 
each firm one annual cost of debt capital value.
22
 There are 15,434 firm years and 315 
unique firms with credit spread and firm-level data for which we also have a corresponding 
Fortune reputation score.  There is no potential survivorship bias in our sample, as we do 
not exclude bonds that have gone bankrupt or those that have matured. 
In this paper, we show that a higher Fortune reputation score leads to a lower cost of 
debt capital, by regressing credit spreads on the reputation score and control variables.  In 
addition, we repeat our analysis by regressing year-over-year changes in spreads on year-
over-year changes in reputation scores as well as year-over-year changes in other 
independent variables.  Essentially the same individuals participate in the Fortune survey 
from year to year, so the change in the Fortune score reveals whether respondents perceive 
improvement or deterioration in the quality of the firm, independent of their base-level 
assessment.  Moreover, in addition to removing firm fixed effects, regressions involving 
changes also make it less likely to capture spurious relationships.  Our analysis using 
changes in variables produces results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the 
analysis that utilizes levels of variables.  These results confirm our finding that better 
reputation, above and beyond tangible factors, leads to lower cost of debt capital.  To the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to show that an improvement in reputation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results using the overall Fortune score.   
22
 Results of our analysis are qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar if we use the end of 
September credit spreads instead of annual averages. 
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predicts a reduction in the cost of debt capital, controlling for changes in other independent 
variables. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Since not all companies are surveyed by Fortune and since not all companies issue 
bonds, it is important to discuss the limitations of our dataset.  We compute summary 
statistics on default measures and financial characteristics for (i) all companies in CRSP, 
(ii) the companies in our bond sample, and (iii) the companies in our Fortune sample.  
These results are summarized in Table 3.1.  While companies in the Fortune sample on 
average are larger than those in the bond sample, and show a slight growth tilt, the two 
samples are otherwise similar.  Not surprisingly, companies in the Fortune sample and the 
bond sample are larger on average than those in the CRSP sample.  There is, however, 
significant dispersion in size, market-to-book, and credit spread values.  There is an average 
of 437 companies in the Fortune sample that have been matched with companies in the 
CRSP sample.  Of these, there is an average of 134 companies that have been matched with 
companies in the bond sample.  While the Fortune and bond samples cover a small portion 
of the total number of companies, they cover a substantial portion in terms of total market 
capitalization.  For instance, in the year 1997, the number of firms with Fortune scores in 
our sample constitutes about 4% of all the firms in the market, and the number of firms with 
active bonds in our sample also constitutes about 4% of all the firms in the market.  But in 
terms of market capitalization, the respective samples capture about 52% and 40% of 
aggregate equity market value in 1997.   
To see how firm reputation is related to default risk measures and firm characteristics, 
we form portfolios based on reputation.  Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for portfolios 
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of companies sorted by the reputation score. According to Table 3.2, more reputable firms 
have higher market-to-book ratios, in both an economic and statistical sense.  That is, more 
reputable firms are more like growth companies; they receive higher Q values.     
Previous research has shown that three characteristics – leverage, idiosyncratic 
volatility, and profitability – are closely associated with corporate default rates.  Low 
leverage, low idiosyncratic volatility, and high profitability predict lower rates of corporate 
defaults.  Table 3.2 indicates a monotonic relationship between reputation and the three 
characteristics.  The more reputable firms exhibit lower leverage (TLMTA), lower 
idiosyncratic volatility (IDIOVOL), and higher profitability (NIMTAVG).  Highly 
reputable firms were also found to possess these characteristics in Anginer and Statman 
(2010).  Table 3.2 also indicates that the more reputable firms have experienced better 
recent stock performance.    
There is a monotonic relationship between reputation score and Merton‘s distance-to-
default measure.  As the reputation score increases so does the distance-to-default measure.  
There is a similar monotonic relationship between reputation score and corporate ratings 
obtained from Standard and Poor‘s.23  The value of the S&P rating decreases as we move 
from the lowest reputation group (L) to the highest reputation group (H) indicating, once 
again, that higher reputed firms have lower default risk.  We observe a similar monotonic 
pattern in portfolios that are sorted with respect to the log-inverted Campbell-Hilscher-
Szilagyi probability of default (hereafter CHS z-score).  The value of the CHS z-score 
increases as we move from the lowest reputation group (L) to the highest reputation group 
                                                          
23
 We follow convention and use a numerical rating scale to covert ratings.  The numerical values 
corresponding to rating notches are 1 for AAA, …, 13 for C. 
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(H).  These monotonic relationships suggest that there may be some overlap between the 
reputation score and standard distress measures.  To better understand the extent of any 
potential overlap, we conduct a more detailed analysis in Section 3.3. 
3.3 Disentangling Reputation from Default Risk  
Previous research has identified that low default risk firms have substantially lower 
credit spreads, i.e. lower costs of debt capital.  Could it be that high reputation firms have 
lower costs of capital simply because reputation is a direct proxy for default risk?  In this 
section, we investigate in detail the relationship between reputation and default risk.   
In particular, we want to see if the inverse and monotonic relationship between firm 
reputation and cost of debt capital persists once we explicitly control for the impact of 
distress risk.  To control for the impact of distress risk, we perform a double sort.  We sort 
stocks into five groups each January from 1983 to 2007 according to reputation scores.  
Then, within each reputation group, we sort stocks based on the previous year‘s distress risk 
measure (using, alternatively, Merton‘s distance to default, S&P rating and CHS z-score) 
into five groups, creating a total of 25 portfolios.  We then calculate average spreads for the 
reputation portfolios after controlling for the effects of distress risk.  We do this by 
averaging the spreads of the five distress portfolios over each of the characteristic 
portfolios.  We use, separately, Merton‘s distance to default, S&P rating and CHS z-score 
as the distress measure.  All three of these variables are described in detail in the appendix. 
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports average spreads for the five reputation portfolios without 
controlling for distress risk, as well as average spreads after controlling for each of the three 
distress risk measures.  We report, in Panel B of Table 3.3, average values of Merton‘s 
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distance to default, S&P rating and CHS z-score for each of the five reputation portfolios.  
There is a strong relationship between reputation and the three distress risk measures.  
Merton‘s distance to default increases monotonically from 4.36 for the lowest reputation 
group to 13.77 for the highest reputation group.  S&P rating decreases from 11.7 for the 
lowest distress group to 4.18 for the highest distress group.  Similarly, CHS z-score 
increases monotonically from 7.37 for the lowest distress group to 8.83 for the highest 
distress group.  
According to Panel A, a zero cost portfolio formed by going long high-reputation firms 
and shorting low-reputation firms has an average spread difference of -109.5 basis points.  
This premium decreases to only -93.6 basis points when we control for the impact of 
distress risk using the CHS z-score.  When we control for distress risk using Merton‘s 
distance to default or S&P rating, the spread difference for the hedge portfolio is not 
reduced.  To the contrary, it is somewhat higher than in the uncontrolled case.  These 
results suggest that the cost of debt capital difference to high-reputation minus low-
reputation bond portfolios cannot be explained away by the impact of distress risk, when 
distress risk is proxied via the traditional measures.  Although there is a significant 
relationship between our reputation score and different (tangible) measures of distress risk, 
as suggested by Table 3.2, the reputation score measures a distinct risk factor affecting the 
cost of debt capital that is not captured by the traditional (tangible) measures of distress 
risk. 
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Panel C of Table 3.3 shows that the impact of reputation is greatest for firms in the 
highest distress risk portfolios.  A zero cost portfolio formed by going long high-reputation 
firms and shorting low-reputation firms has an average spread difference of  
-284.54 basis points, when these firms are in the highest distress risk group.  However, the 
zero cost portfolio has an average spread difference of only -57.70 basis points, when these 
firms are in the lowest distress risk group.  These results suggest that borrowing costs of 
high distress risk firms are a lot more sensitive to the impact of reputation. 
3.4. Results 
In this section, we first examine in greater detail the relationship between the cost of 
debt capital and a firm‘s reputation, as measured by its Fortune score.  We then show 
empirically that the reputation measure is a good ex ante predictor of corporate default.  We 
find that our measure of reputation contains information on default risk above and beyond 
that conveyed by the standard measures.   
3.4.1 Reputation and Credit Spreads 
To examine the relationship between the cost of debt capital and firm reputation, we run 
Fama MacBeth regressions and OLS regressions with year fixed effects and firm-level 
clustered standard errors, where we proxy for the cost of debt capital via firm-level 
corporate bond spreads described in Section 3.1.     
Table 3.4 reports Fama-Macbeth regressions of credit spreads on the reputation score, 
with standard credit-risk controls.  In Panel A, both the dependent and the independent 
variables are in levels, while in Panel B, they are in changes.  In each specification, the 
coefficient on the reputation variable is highly significant and takes a negative value.  That 
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is, Panel A shows a robust inverse relationship between a firm‘s reputation and the credit 
spread on its bonds.  Firms with better reputations enjoy lower credit spreads.    Panel B 
shows the same robust inverse relationship using changes in reputation.  Firms with 
improving reputations see their credit spreads decline, and firms with deteriorating 
reputations see their credit spreads increase.  
The reputation score is able to explain a substantial amount of the cross-sectional 
variation in credit spreads.  To see this, consider the first column of Panel A, where credit 
spreads are regressed on the reputation variable alone.  That regression produces an R
2
 
value of 25%.  In the second column, credit spreads are regressed on the covariates used by 
CHS (2008).  That regression produces an R
2
 value of 60%.  A comparison of these two R
2 
values shows that reputation, by itself, is able to explain a surprisingly large amount of 
cross-sectional variation.     
More importantly, we find the same result when we use changes in variables, as 
observed in Panel B of Table 3.4.  In the first column of Panel B, year-over-year changes in 
credit spreads are regressed on the year-over-year change in the reputation variable alone, 
which produces an R
2
 value of 9%.  In the second column, year-over-year changes in credit 
spreads are regressed on changes in the year-over-year CHS covariates, and this regression 
produces an R
2
 value of 35%.  Our change-in-reputation measure is able to explain a 
substantial amount of cross-sectional variation.  When change in reputation is added as a 
covariate to the CHS model (in the third column), the R
2
 value increases from 35% to 39%.  
Whether we use levels of variables or changes in variables, our reputation measure 
substantially increases the credit spread variation we are able to explain.  
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Next, we regress credit spreads on the reputation variable in conjunction with another 
default measure – either Merton‘s distance to default, the CHS z-score, or the S&P rating – 
in columns (4), (5), and (6), respectively.  In each case, the coefficient on reputation 
remains significant and negative despite the inclusion of the other default measure.  This is 
true regardless of whether we examine levels (Panel A) or changes (Panel B).  Moreover, 
these pairs of variables are able to explain a large portion of the cross-sectional variation in 
credit spreads, with R
2
 values of 32%, 37%, and 51% respectively when using levels, and 
with R
2
 values of 16%, 17% and 16% respectively when using changes.  
The impact of reputation on the cost of debt capital, in addition to being highly 
statistically significant, is also highly economically significant.  In the first column of Panel 
B in Table 3.4, we see that a half-point (0.5) increase in the reputation score, or moving one 
quintile up in the reputation ranking, reduces the cost of debt capital by an economically 
significant 0.25%, or 25 basis points.  In the third column of the same panel, we see that the 
impact of reputation is somewhat reduced after introducing the firm-level variables known 
to affect credit risk.  Nevertheless, even in the presence of these default-risk related 
variables, we observe that a half-point (0.5) increase in the reputation score, or moving one 
quintile up in the reputation ranking, reduces the cost of debt capital by an economically 
significant 0.1%, or 10 basis points.
24
 
Our findings contribute to the literature that has attempted to explain the variation in 
credit spread changes.  Prior studies have been able to explain only a small fraction of 
changes in credit spreads using tangible factors (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne, 
                                                          
24
 We also controlled for firm age, which some in the finance literature have previously suggested as a proxy 
for reputation.  But most firms with Fortune scores are mature firms, and adding firm age to our analysis 
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Goldstein and Martin 2001).  Those studies find that there is a large component of credit 
spread changes that is not explained by the tangible information employed by their models.  
Our measure of reputation captures intangible information - the knowledge and perceptions 
of industry experts - and the incorporation of that intangible substantially improves our 
ability to explain cross-sectional variation in credit spread changes.   
As a robustness check, we confirm our results by conducting ordinary-least-squares 
regressions with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the firm level. The 
results appear in Table 3.5, with Panel A employing levels and Panel B employing changes.  
The results are similar to those in Table 3.4 using Fama-Macbeth style regressions.  The 
reputation score consistently improves our ability to explain credit spread changes.  In 
addition, in column (7), we introduce three macro variables to control for the market risk 
premium (MKT), the yield spread between long-term (10-year) treasury bonds and the 
short-term (three-month) treasuries (TERM) as a proxy for unexpected changes in the term 
structure, and the BAA-AAA corporate bond spread (DEF) as a proxy for default risk.  
Notwithstanding these controls, the reputation variable retains its statistical and economic 
significance, both in terms of levels of variables and changes in variables.   
Since Diamond and Milgrom and Roberts view reputations as emerging out of 
asymmetric information, it is important to examine how the information environment 
affects the relationship between reputation and the cost of debt.  Reputation can substitute 
for tangible information about a borrower.  When there is less tangible information about a 
firm readily available to investors, reputation should play a greater role in determining the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
neither improves the explanatory power of our regressions nor reduces the impact of the Fortune reputation 
score on the cost of debt capital. 
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cost of debt.  Thus, the ability of market participants to observe and gather tangible 
information about the firm should affect the value they attach to a company‘s reputation.   
Prior research suggests that financial analysts play a key role in mitigating information 
asymmetry between firms and market participants (see Brennan and Hughes 1991; Hong, 
Lim and Stein 2000; and Agarwal and O‘Hara 2006).  Hence, reputation should be more 
important for firms with lower analyst coverage.  We include the number of analysts 
following a firm, ANALYSTS, in specification (7) of Table 3.4 and specification (8) of 
Table 3.5.  To construct that variable, we take the average number of analysts making 
annual estimates for a firm in a given year.   
The coefficient on ANALYSTS is significant and negative.  Firms with lower analyst 
coverage have greater credit spreads.  More importantly, the reputation variable remains 
highly significant despite the inclusion of the ANALYSTS variable.  The impact of 
reputation is not subsumed by the firm‘s analyst coverage.   
If firm reputation helps to determine a company‘s cost of debt, its impact should be 
most pronounced when this type of intangible information is most valuable to investors – 
when other information about the firm is less readily available from analysts.  To test this, 
we interact the analyst coverage measure with the reputation measure.  The coefficient on 
this interaction term is positive and significant, both in the Fama-Macbeth regression using 
levels (Panel A of Table 3.4) and in the OLS regression using levels (Panel A of Table 3.5).  
Firms with lower analyst coverage, but higher reputation scores, have lower credit spreads.  
The result indicates that firm reputation has an even larger impact on credit spreads when a 
company is covered by fewer analysts - that is, when it is more informationally opaque.  
Once again, we find similar results using changes in variables (in Panel B of each Table).  
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The coefficient on the change in ANALYSTS is significant and negative.  Firms with 
decreasing analyst coverage have greater credit spreads.  And the coefficient on the 
interaction term, ΔREPUTATION * ΔANALYSTS, is significant and positive for the 
ordinary-least-squares regressions with year fixed effects and firm-level clusters (Panel B 
of Table 3.5).  This result suggests that when declining analyst coverage is accompanied by 
improving firm reputation, firms see statistically and economically significant reductions in 
their credit spreads.   
In addition to analyst coverage, we also use firm size to measure the availability of 
tangible information.
25
  Fama (1985) argues that the information supplied by a firm 
increases with its size.  Similarly, Easley and O‘Hara (2004) show that size acts as a 
measure of the information structure of the firm.  Hence, reputation should play a greater 
role for smaller companies. Results appear in Panel A of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 (in 
specifications (8) and (9), respectively).  Indeed, the significant negative coefficient on log 
ME indicates that small firms have higher credit spreads.  More importantly, the coefficient 
on the interaction term, REPUTATION * log ME, is significant and positive.  Small firms 
that have high reputation scores see a further reduction in credit spreads. 
Whether we measure the availability of information using analyst coverage or firm size, 
we reach a similar conclusion: as less information is available to outsiders, a firm‘s 
reputation carries more weight in the pricing of its debt.  The value that market participants 
attach to a firm‘s reputation varies with their ability to observe and gather tangible 
information about the firm.  Stating it in broader terms, the impact of firm reputation on the 
                                                          
25
 We also used PIN (Probability of Informed Trading), an alternative measure of information asymmetry, and 
got qualitatively similar results.  However, we do not include in this paper the results with the PIN measure, as 
there can be alternative interpretations of what PIN measures in this context. 
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cost of debt varies with the information environment of the firm.  In that sense, our study 
extends recent papers that examine how firms can lower borrowing costs by engaging 
reputable third-party certifiers, such as auditors, underwriters, banks and securities 
exchanges.  Studies suggest that third-party certification can lower borrowing costs by 
overcoming information problems between insiders and outsiders (Fang 2005; Pittman and 
Fortin 2004; Mansi et al. 2004; Andres, Betzer and Limbach 2011; Livingston and Miller 
2000; Datta et al. 1997).  In addition to exploiting the reputations of third-party certifiers, 
firms exploit their own reputations as well. 
The results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that a half-point (0.5) improvement in the 
reputation score, or moving up a quintile in reputation rankings, reduces the cost of debt 
capital by at least 10 basis points, even after taking into account the impact of all other 
firm-level and macro-level variables that are known to affect credit risk.  This impact is 
more significant for firms that are informationally opaque and for firms that have high 
distress risk.   
3.4.2 Reputation and Failure Prediction 
While the previous section shows that the Fortune reputation score helps to explain 
changes in credit spreads, this section reveals the reason why it does so: the reputation score 
captures soft information about whether a firm will fail to honor its commitments.  In this 
section, we show that the reputation score improves failure prediction above and beyond 
measures previously used in the literature.   
To measure the probability o f  a  c o r p o r a t e  f a i l u r e , we estimate a dynamic 
panel model using a logit specification, following Anginer and Yildizhan (2010), Shumway 
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(2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), CHS (2008), and others.  We use information available at 
the end of the calendar year to predict failures twelve months ahead. Specifically, the 
marginal probability of failure (PF) for company i over the next year t is assumed to 
follow a logistic distribution:   
1
= 
1 exp
i
t i
t
PF
X
  (3.1) 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables available at the time of prediction, and 
includes a comprehensive list of explanatory variables that have been used by previous 
papers to predict corporate failures.  Our failure measure is defined as a rating downgrade 
to CCC+ or below by Standard and Poor‘s, a severely negative assessment of a company‘s 
capability of meeting its obligations.  We employ accounting variables used in CHS (2008) 
as well as Merton‘s distance-to-default measure.  All variables included in the hazard 
regressions that follow are described in detail in the appendix.   
Results are reported in Table 3.6.  In the first two columns, we include only covariates 
used by CHS (2008).  The first column includes all observations, and the second column 
includes only observations with an associated reputation score.  The coefficient estimates, 
and the McFadden‘s pseudo R2 values26, are very similar, indicating that the sub-sample of 
firms with a reputation score does not differ significantly from the overall sample.   
Coefficient estimates in both specifications are as expected.  The coefficients on 
NIMTAAVG and EXRETAVG are significant and negative, indicating that greater 
profitability and greater stock performance lower default probability, in line with the 
                                                          
26
 McFadden‘s pseudo R2 is calculated as 1 − L1/L0, where L1 is the log likelihood of the estimated model and 
L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. 
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literature‘s findings.  The coefficients on TLMTA and SIGMA are significant and positive, 
indicating that greater leverage and greater stock volatility increase default probability, 
again in line with established results.   The coefficients on CASHMTA and MB are 
statistically insignificant, which is not surprising given that these are large firms. 
In the third column, we add the reputation score, REPUTATION, as an additional 
covariate to the CHS specification. The reputation variable improves the explanatory power 
of the CHS model.  The pseudo R
2
 value increases from 22.6% for the CHS model to 24.1% 
for the CHS model used in conjunction with the reputation variable.  The reputation 
variable supplies substantial additional information for failure prediction.  Moreover, the 
coefficient on reputation is highly significant, with the anticipated negative sign.  A higher 
reputation score significantly lowers failure probability. 
We confirm that the reputation variable adds explanatory power by running additional 
regressions in columns (4) and (5).  The specification in column (4) uses Merton‘s distance 
to default alone, and has a pseudo R
2
 of 21.6%.  When the reputation score is added as a 
covariate to Merton‘s distance to default, in column (5), pseudo R2 increases to 23.4%.  
Thus, the reputation score contributes failure-related information that is not already 
captured by Merton‘s distance to default.  Moreover, the coefficient on reputation remains 
highly significant, with the anticipated negative sign.   
The common conclusion is that our reputation measure helps to predict failures better 
than using only the CHS variables, Merton‘s distance to default or S&P rating.  The 
perception of a firm among industry experts improves failure prediction, even when we 
control for the tangible determinants of credit risk.  The success of the reputation variable in 
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failure prediction suggests that the reputation measure is capturing intangible information 
not contained by the standard variables. 
3.4.3 Robustness Tests 
We repeated all of the analysis conducted in Tables 3.1 through 3.6 using the individual 
reputation components separately.  Our results, qualitatively and statistically, remained the 
same.   
We also conducted a Principal Component Analysis on the eight sub components of our 
Reputation score: long term investment value; quality of management; quality of products 
or services; financial soundness; wise use of assets; innovativeness; responsibility to the 
community and the environment; and the ability to attract, develop, and keep talented 
people.  Our analysis suggests that the first principal component of these eight reputation 
attributes explains 85% of the variation for Reputation. The first principal component is the 
only component that has an Eigenvalue greater than 1 and as such it is the only significant 
principal component as would be suggested by the Kaiser criteria. There are no outliers in 
any of our reputation observations so this traditional principal component analysis is robust.  
Most importantly the correlation between the first principal component and the mean 
reputation score utilized in Tables 3.1 through 3.6 (overall score) is 99.97%.  Repeating the 
analysis, conducted in Tables 3.1 through 3.6, using the first principal component yields 
results that are qualitatively and statistically similar.  Results of the principal component 
analysis are reported in Table 3.7  
 
 
 77 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Although the theoretical literature since Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Diamond 
(1989) has recognized that reputation should impact credit relationships, to date that impact 
has never been fully quantified.  We show that firm reputation – that intangible way in 
which a company is perceived by others – plays an important role in determining the cost of 
debt.  We measure company reputation using the annual ranking of ―Most Admired 
Companies‖ published by Fortune magazine, which surveys industry experts about firm 
reputations.  We find a robust inverse relationship between a firm‘s reputation as measured 
by its score in the Fortune survey and the firm-level value-weighted credit spread on its 
bonds.  A half-point (0.5) improvement in the reputation score, or moving one quintile up in 
the reputation ranking,  leads to a reduction of 10 to 20 basis points in the cost of debt 
capital, even after controlling for firm-level and macro-level variables that are known to 
impact bond spreads.  Change in the reputation score is also able to explain a substantial 
amount of the cross-sectional variation in change in credit spreads on corporate bonds.  Our 
findings contribute to the literature that has attempted to explain variation in credit spread 
changes, as prior studies have been able to explain only a small fraction of that variation.  
Those studies find that a large component of credit spread changes is not explained by the 
tangible information their models employ.  By explicitly accounting for an intangible 
element of credit risk, we substantially improve our ability to explain cross-sectional 
variation in credit spread changes.  To our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly account 
for this intangible component of reputation in explaining changes in the cost of debt capital.  
Furthermore, we show that the impact of this intangible is most significant for firms that are 
informationally opaque or that already have high distress risk.  The sensitivity of cost of 
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debt capital to changes in the reputation score is highest for smaller firms, for firms with 
lower analyst coverage, and for firms with higher distress risk. 
We also show why the Fortune reputation score helps to explain credit spread changes: 
it captures soft information about whether a firm will fail to honor its commitments.  Our 
reputation measure is a good ex ante predictor of corporate distress, improving upon 
standard measures used in the literature.  Our reputation variable contains information 
about default risk above and beyond that conveyed by accounting and market variables, 
corporate ratings and structural parameters.  Our results show that credit risk has an 
important, but largely ignored, intangible aspect.       
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APPENDIX  
 
Here we explain the details of the variables used to construct distress measures.  Quarterly 
COMPUSTAT data is used to compute all accounting variables.   
Our first measure is the CHS probability of default:   
 
-   9.164 20.264 1.416 
7.129 1.411 0.045 
2.132 0.075 0.058 
t t t
t t t
t t t
CHS score NIMTAAVG TLMTA
EXRETAVG SIGMA RSIZE
CASHMTA MB PRICE
 
 
where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net 
income (data69) to total assets:  
2
1, 12 1, 3 10, 1212
1
...
1t t t t t t
NIMTAAVG NIMTA NIMTA  
EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns 
relative to the S&P 500 index: 
11
1, 12 1 1212
1
...
1t t t t
EXRETAVG EXRET EXRET  
The weighting coefficient is set to  = 2−1/3, such that the weight is halved each quarter. 
TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities (data69) to total assets.  SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months.  SIGMA is coded as missing 
if there are fewer than 5 observations.  RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the 
market value of the S&P 500 index.  CASHMTA is the ratio of the value of cash and short 
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term investments (data36) to the value of total assets.  MB is the market-to-book ratio.  
Book equity is as defined in Davis, Fama and French (2000).  All variables are winsorized 
using a 1/99 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.  CHS probabilities are 
calculated using coefficients obtained from hazard regressions that are used to predict 
bankruptcies in the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT tape.  We transform CHS probability of 
bankruptcy into a ―CHS Z-score‖ form using the inverse logistic function, so that   
Pr
1 Pr
= ln 
CHS obability
CHS obability
CHS Z score  
As CHS probability approaches zero (one),  CHS Z-score approaches negative (positive) 
infinity.  Including such extremely large (absolute) values in the regression will cause very 
large standard errors and result in low likelihood values.  To avoid these statistical 
problems, we winsorize the sample so that the minimum (maximum) value of CHS 
probability equals 0.00001 (0.99999). 
We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) to calculate our second distress 
measure, Merton‘s distance to default.  The market equity value of a company is modeled 
as a call option on the company‘s assets: 
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Above EV  is the market value of a firm.  AV  is the value of firm‘s assets. X is the face value 
of debt maturing at time T.  r is the risk-free rate and  is the dividend rate expressed in 
terms of AV .  A  is the volatility of the value of assets, which is related to equity volatility 
through the following equation: 
 
1( ) /
T
E A A EV e N d V  
 
We simultaneously solve the above two equations to find the values of AV  and A .  We use 
the market value of equity for EV and short-term plus one half long-term book debt to proxy 
for the face value of debt X (data45+1/2*data51).  E  is the standard deviation of daily 
equity returns over the past 3 months.  T equals one year, and r is the one-year treasury bill 
rate. The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the prior year‘s common and preferred dividends 
(data19 + data21) divided by the market value of assets.  We use the Newton method to 
simultaneously solve the two equations above.  For starting values for the unknown 
variables we use, A EV V X , and ( )A E E EV V X .    Once we determine asset 
values, AV , we then compute asset returns as in Hillegeist et al. (2004): 
 
, , 1
, 1
max ,A t A tt
A t
V Dividends V
r
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Since expected returns cannot be negative, asset returns below zero are set to the risk-free 
rate.
27
  Finally, Merton‘s distance to default is computed as: 
2log / / 2A A
A
V X T
MertonDD
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 We obtain similar results if we use a 6% equity premium instead of asset returns as in CHS (2008). 
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Table 3.2: Fortune Companies 
 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and distress measures for portfolios of companies 
sorted by the level of the REPUTATION score from low (L) to high (H).  SPREAD is the firm-level credit 
spread calculated as described in Section 3.1, NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values 
of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the 
market value of total assets, EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock 
returns relative to the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets, 
TOTVOL is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous calendar year, IDIOVOL is the 
standard deviation of regression errors obtained from regressing daily excess returns on the Fama and French 
(1993) factors, MB is the market-to-book ratio, Log ME is log value of the market capitalization (measured in 
thousands), MERTONDD is the Merton distance-to-default measure, CHS-Z is the CHS z-score, RATING is 
the Standard & Poor‘s corporate rating obtained from COMPUSTAT where the rating has been converted to 
numeric value (AAA=1, …, C=13), MOMENTUM is the cumulative return over the prior twelve months. The 
computation of these variables is described in the appendix. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 Companies sorted based on REPUTATION 
  L 2 3 4 H H-L 
REPUTATION 5.115 5.956 6.418 6.897 7.645  2.551*** 
SPREAD 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.007 -0.009*** 
NIMTAVG 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007   0.005*** 
TLMTA 0.603 0.544 0.528 0.504 0.398 -0.204*** 
EXRETAVG    -0.005    -0.002    -0.002    -0.001 0.001   0.006*** 
CASHMTA 0.060 0.050 0.066 0.052 0.051      -0.009*** 
TOTVOL 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 -0.005*** 
IDIOVOL 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 -0.006*** 
MB 1.718 2.084 2.122 2.317 2.971   1.252*** 
Log ME 8.128 8.861 8.947 9.271 10.070        1.943*** 
MERTONDD 6.881 8.087 8.571 8.934 11.167   4.286*** 
CHS-Z 7.699 7.882 7.978 7.980 8.166   0.467*** 
RATING 9.865 8.627 7.827 7.422 5.934  -3.931*** 
MOMENTUM 0.217 0.175 0.177 0.179 0.147      -0.071*** 
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Table 3.3: Cost of Capital in Reputation-Sorted Portfolios, Controlling for Default Risk  
 
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the mean annual spreads for reputation portfolios before and after controlling for 
different measures of default risk, i.e. Merton‘s distance to default, S&P ratings and Campbell, Hilscher, 
Szilagyi z-score (CHS z-score). Default risk portfolios are formed by sorting stocks into five groups each 
January from 1983 to 2007 according to Merton‘s distance to default.  Then within each default risk group we 
sort stocks into five groups based on their Fortune reputation score, creating a total of 25 portfolios. The five 
reputation portfolios are averaged over each of the distance to default portfolios to account for the impact of 
distress risk. Finally we calculate the average spreads for the reputation portfolios as well as the high-
reputation minus low-reputation hedge portfolio. The same procedure is repeated for S&P rating and CHS z-
score. In Panel B of Table 3.3 we report the average values of different distress risk measures in the five 
reputation portfolios as well as the mean difference for these measures for the high-reputation minus low-
reputation hedge portfolio. In Panel C of Table 3.3 we first sort firms each year into five quintiles on the basis 
of their most recent CHS z-score. Then, within each default risk quintile, we sort stocks into five portfolios 
based on their Fortune reputation scores, creating a total of 25 portfolios. We report average spreads for each 
of the twenty-five portfolios as well as the high-reputation minus low-reputation hedge portfolios in each 
default risk (CHS z-score) category. Merton‘s distance to default, S&P rating and CHS z-score are calculated 
as described in the appendix. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Average Spreads for Reputation-Sorted Portfolios 
(in basis points) Before/After Controlling for Default Risk 
  L 2 3 4 H H-L 
Before controls 
  203.6***      142.5***      118.1***      113.2***      94.1***    -109.5*** 
 (9.31)    (11.21)    (18.66)       (13.67)    (11.66)    (5.05) 
        
Controlling for Distance to Default 
  226.6***      148.9***      129.8***      112.6***      96.6***    -129.9*** 
 (7.23)    (10.26)    (9.27)      (12.74)    (12.70)    (4.78) 
        
Controlling for S&P Rating 
  212.1***      163.4***      136.6***      110.4***      88.8***    -123.3*** 
 (8.65)    (7.48)    (5.44)      (7.77)    (13.87)    (5.61) 
        
Controlling for CHS Z-Score  
  198.8***      141.8***      131.4***      112.1***      105.2***     -93.6*** 
 (6.71)    (10.02)    (7.98)       (13.03)    (10.07)    (4.25) 
       
Panel B: Mean Values of Default Risk Measures in Reputation-Sorted Portfolios 
Merton‘s Distance to Default 4.36*** 6.22*** 7.79*** 9.53*** 13.77*** 9.41*** 
S&P Rating  11.7*** 8.96*** 7.21*** 5.78*** 4.18*** -7.49*** 
CHS Z-Score 7.37*** 7.87*** 8.15*** 8.41*** 8.83*** 1.48*** 
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Table 3.3: Cost of Capital in Reputation Sorted Portfolios, Controlling for Default Risk 
 
Table 3.3, Panel C 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Average Spreads (in basis points) for Portfolios Double-Sorted Based on Reputation and CHS Z-Score 
  Reputation   
CHS Z-Score L 1 2 3 H H-L 
L 383.57*** 225.21*** 158.88*** 127.46*** 99.02*** -284.54*** 
Highest Default Risk Group  (5.25) (3.90) (10.08) (7.76) (10.02) (4.16) 
1 240.55*** 152.04*** 109.92*** 114.76*** 91.71*** -148.84*** 
  (6.48) (9.84) (11.86) (8.76) (9.03) (4.66) 
2 214.48*** 130.84*** 120.49*** 114.37*** 76.73*** -137.76*** 
  (4.38) (8.48) (11.370 (8.70) (11.76) (3.03) 
3 147.93*** 128.85*** 105.13*** 102.15*** 76.32*** -71.61*** 
  (8.25) (9.41) (11.48) (13.97) (13.53) (4.09) 
H 136.50*** 111.78*** 107.44*** 91.55*** 78.81*** -57.70*** 
Lowest Default Risk Group (8.14) (8.32) (7.92) (8.72) (11.80) (3.80) 
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Table 3.4: Fama-Macbeth Regressions, Using Levels and Changes, Panel A 
 
Table 3.4 reports Fama-Macbeth regressions of SPREAD on characteristics and distress measures. In Panel A, 
all variables are in levels and, in Panel B, all variables are in changes.  SPREAD is the firm-level credit spread 
calculated as described in Section 3.1, NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the 
ratio of net income to the market value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market 
value of total assets, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets,  RETURN is the 
cumulative return over the past year,  IDIOVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, MB is the market-to-book ratio, 
Log ME is the logarithm of market capitalization (measured in thousands), MERTONDD is the Merton‘s 
distance-to-default measure, CHS-Z is the CHS z-score, RATING is the Standard & Poor‘s corporate rating 
converted into numeric value (AAA=1, …, C=13), ANALYSTS is the number of analysts (divided by 100) 
that follow the firm. The computation of these variables is described in the appendix. All variables with the 
―Δ‖ prefix are changes from the prior-year values for the variables.  p-values are reported below coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Levels of Variables 
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Table 3.4: Fama-Macbeth Regressions, Using Levels and Changes, Panel B 
 
Panel B: Changes in Variables 
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Table 3.5: OLS Regressions, with Year Fixed Effects and Firm Clustered Errors, Panel A 
 
Table 3.5 reports ordinary least squares regressions of SPREAD on characteristics and distress measures. In 
Panel A, all variables are in levels and, in Panel B, all variables are in changes.  SPREAD is the firm-level 
credit spread calculated as described in Section 3.1, NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past 
values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets,  TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to 
the market value of total assets, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets,  RETURN 
is the cumulative return over the last year,  IDIOVOL is the standard deviation of regression errors obtained 
from regressing daily excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors, MB is the market-to-book ratio, 
Log ME is log market capitalization (measured in thousands), MERTONDD is the Merton distance-to-default 
measure, CHS-Z is the CHS z-score, RATING is the Standard & Poor‘s corporate rating converted to numeric 
value (AAA=1, …, C=13), DEF is the BAA-AAA corporate bond spread, TERM is the yield spread between 
long-term (10-year) treasury bonds and the short-term (three-month) treasuries, MKT is the market risk 
premium, ANALYSTS is the number of analysts (divided by 100) that follow the firm.  The computation of 
these variables is described in the appendix. Except for model (7), all the regressions include fixed yearly 
effects.  All variables with the ―Δ‖ prefix are changes from the prior-year values for the variables.  Standard 
errors are calculated based on firm-level clusters.  p-values are reported below coefficient estimates.  
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: OLS Regressions, with Year Fixed Effects and Firm Clustered Errors, Panel B 
 
 
Panel B: Changes in Variables 
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Table 3.6: Failure Prediction – CHS Covariates, Merton’s Distance to Default & Fortune 
Scores 
 
Table 3.6 reports results from logit regressions of the failure indicator on predictor variables.  
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG 
is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, CASHMTA is the 
ratio of cash to the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, and MERTONDD is 
Merton‘s distance to default measure. REPUTATION is that year‘s overall Fortune reputation score.  We 
define a ―Failure‖ event as an S&P rating downgrade to CCC+ or below in the following year. The 
computation of these variables is described in the appendix. P-values are reported below coefficient 
estimates.  McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively 
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Table 3.7: Principal Component Analysis of the Reputation Score 
 
Table 3.7 reports results from principal component analysis conducted on the sub-components of the Fortune 
Reputation survey.  v1 is long term investment value, v2 is quality of management, v3 is quality of products 
or services, v4 is financial soundness, v5 is wise use of assets, v6 is innovativeness, v7 is responsibility to the 
community and the environment and v8 is the ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people. Comp1 
through Comp8 are the principal components. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
